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Abstract 
This thesis examines George Eliot's novels The Mill on the Floss (1860) and Daniel 
Deronda (1876) within the context of the Victorian era's transformation into an 
increasingly secularised society, and the consequential concerns regarding social 
morality and human destiny. Eliot's own intellectual position and influence is of 
critical concern to this paper, both in her non-fiction writings and in the novels 
themselves. 
The central argument examines Eliot's concerns regarding individual and 
social development as interrogated in both novels, focusing on the moral struggles of 
the individual, and the implications for the perceived conflict between the individual 
and society. In the first two chapters, each examining one novel, the key concern is 
the perception and experience of moral struggle, and how this effects the individual 
development of the central characters, particularly in terms of the implications for 
social concerns regarding the issue of human redemption. The issues raised by close 
readings of both novels are discussed in the final chapter, in the context of Eliot's 
engagement with the philosophical, religious, and social debates of the period, 
particularly regarding the idea of organic human development in the works of 
Auguste Comte and J. S. Mill. 
The contemporary critical focus is on the issue of the moral human 
development of the central characters of both novels, the complexity and ambiguity 
which arise from the endings of both texts, and in terms of Eliot's own philosophical 
position, the Victorian context regarding the ethos of human salvation in a 
secularised society. 
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Introduction 
I lived in a continual, indefinite, pining Fear; tremulous... 
apprehensive of I knew not what... as if the heavens and the 
Earth were but boundless Jaws of a devouring Monster, 
wherein I, palpitating, waited to be devoured... 
(Carlyle Sartor Resartus 128) 
In Victorian Britain, an increasing number of critical literary works were published 
which destabilised, and indeed began to dismantle, the received framework of 
Christianity, and contributed to a fervid and anxious social debate. This critical 
dialogue is born out of the dissemination of European philosophical thinking, the 
emergence of Biblical criticism, and the Victorian era's own rapidly changing social 
structures, leading to concerns over social morality and human destiny. This thesis 
is concerned with exploring George Eliot's own position and influence in this aspect 
of the debate, within the paradigm of Victorian social thinking. 
Charles Lyell's Principles of Geology (1830) and Charles Darwin's The 
Origin of Species (1859) are amongst those works that introduced the notion of 
evolution to Victorian society, thereby questioning Biblical truth concerning the 
creation of the world and the origin of humankind. Charles Hennell's An Inquiry 
Concerning the Origin of Christianity (1838), read by George Eliot in 1841', D. F. 
Strauss's L?fe  of Jesus, translated into English by Eliot in 1846, and L. Feuerbach's 
The Essence of Christianity, translated by Eliot in 1854, profoundly affected Eliot's 
own religious faith and contributed enormously to contemporary Victorian thinking 
about religion, social morality and social form. Eliot also translated B. Spinoza's 
Tractatus theologico-politicus in 1849 and his Ethics in 1854, and mad other 
philosophical works such as Auguste Comte's Positive Philosophy (1830-42), and J. 
See Eliot Selected Critical Writings ed. Rosemary Ashton, p.xxxvii. 
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W. Goethe's literature, and this vast reading both contributed to, and reflected, 
Eliot's own philosophical and religious deliberations. 
Whilst an in-depth exploration of Eliot's philosophical relationship with these 
individual thinkers is outside the remit of this project, it is important to recognise 
that the position Eliot occupies in both her fictional and non-fiction writings reflects 
significant aspects of her engagement with these works. In 1842, Eliot writes: 
I regard... [Biblical] writings as histories consisting of mingled truth and 
fiction, and while I admire and cherish much of what I believe to have been 
the moral teaching of Jesus himself, I consider the system of doctrines built 
upon the facts of his life and drawn as to its materials from Jewish notions to 
be most dishonourable to God and most pernicious in its influence on 
individual and social happiness. (Letters 21) 
Eliot's non-fiction essay writing began in 1846 with her essays and reviews for 
prestigious journals, particularly the Westminster Review, for which she also acted as 
Editor in the 1850's. This is significant as, alongside her published translations, it 
illustrates Eliot's own position in the midst of philosophical, social and literary 
deliberations, and provides a framework within which to consider her fictional 
writing. Her fiction becomes the arena in which she explores the human 
implications of the philosophical, religious and social deliberations with which she 
- and her contemporary society are concerned. The object of this thesis is to explore 
the relationship between key aspects of Eliot's thinking, and one of her earliest 
novels The Mill on the Floss, and her final novel Daniel Deronda. The crucial 
aspects which relate to this thesis are, following Feuerbach (with whose 'ideas... I 
everywhere agree' (Eliot Letters 132)), Eliot's advocacy of human relations as the 
object of religion rather than an ethic of eternal Salvation, and consequently, the 
importance of desiring better human and social values here on earth. Although she 
rejects Biblical truth for a historical-critical perspective, Eliot retains a strong belief 
in the relevance and import of Christian moral values. 
Whilst the examination of the two novels, and Eliot's philosophical context, 
will be primarily discussed within the paradigm of contemporary Victorian thinking, 
it will engage with particular aspects of Eliot criticism. In particular, K. M. 
Newton's examination of Eliot's retention of a positive Romantic aesthetic in her 
work will be drawn upon where relevant, and Nina Auerbach's discussions of the 
Victorian mythology of woman as demon is examined in relation to The Mill on the 
Floss. Patricia Spacks' work on the female literary imagination, and Brian Swann's 
discussion of imagery pertinent to Gwendolen will be addressed in relation to 
aspects of Daniel Deronda, and Heather Armstrong's valuable examination of 
Eliot's ethical stance provides a key influence in this second chapter. Rosemary 
Ashton's work on the influence of German philosophy on Eliot, Gillian Beer's 
examination of the influence of evolutionary thought, and Suzanne Graver's work on 
organicism are particularly pertinent in the discussion of Eliot's philosophical 
position in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 1 will examine Eliot's 1860 novel, The Mill on the Floss. The central 
character, Maggie Tulliver, is a yearning individual who desires to attain 'all that 
was beautiful and glad: thirsty for all knowledge' (MF 320), yet in her journey from 
childhood into adulthood, she endures emotional and psychological anxiety and 
struggle with social expectations that her aim in life should be to conform to what it 
considers to be her duty. Whilst recognising that this bears an explicitly gendered 
element in the novel, I will argue that the sense of social duty imposed by St.Ogg's 
is recognised as a force that is incompatible with human aspirations, and that this has 
devastating consequences for both Maggie and her brother Tom. By concentrating 
particularly on Maggie's relationship with Tom, I will explore how her need for his 
love and acceptance is representative of her struggle with societal values, but 
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significantly, encapsulates her need for a full and meaningful human existence. I 
will analyse how Maggie's journey follows a trajectory through her perpetual 
struggle between her own desires and the coercive nature of social duty, and centres 
on the fear of a "fall" from "grace", ascetic self-abnegation, and the struggle for a 
secularised salvation through human redemption. The chapter will explore how Tom 
is also coerced by the strictures of societal duty, and experiences his own trials of 
self-denial. The significance of his relationship with Maggie will be examined in 
terms of how both Tulliver children struggle to pursue their own desires, against 
which obligations toward familial and social duty seem to pit themselves, and I will 
explore how the implications of this inform the final tragedy of The Mill on the 
Floss. 
In Eliot's 1876 novel, Daniel Deronda, Owendolen Harleth begins with a deep 
sense that 'so exceptional a person as herself could hardly remain in ordinary 
circumstances or in a social position less than advantageous' (DD 23-4), but ends the 
novel hoping that 'I may live to be one of the best of women, who make others glad 
that they were born [although] I do not yet see how that can be' (810, original 
emphasis). Chapter 2 will explore how Gwendolen initially denies - but ultimately 
cannot prevent - the emergence of her own moral conscience, and how this develops 
through her relationship with Daniel Deronda. Daniel's own journey of self-
realisation is a quest for an as yet unknown 'complete ideal shape of that personal 
duty and citizenship which lay in his own thought like sculptured fragments' (512), 
and I will examine this in terms of his relationship with Owendolen and the final 
ethos of the novel. I will analyse Gwendolen's development of conscience from 
naïve ignorance, through a "fall" into knowledge through the experience of self-
comprehension and a subsequent quasi-religious crisis, and on into a potential 
maturity of human redemption. I will explore the significance of Gwendolen's 
gradual deification of Daniel, and Daniel's ultimate rejection of Gwendolen in 
relation to the struggles and concerns of them both. 
In Chapter 3, the issues raised will be examined alongside a deeper 
exploration of Eliot's own philosophical thinking, centring on the issue of individual 
and social salvation. This will be contextualised particularly with the writings of J. 
S. Mill, and the relationship between Eliot and Mill will be examined in the context 
of Comte's Positive Philosophy, alongside significant aspects of the influence of 
Feuerbach and Goethe on Eliot's concerns. Gender issues are clearly a crucial factor 
in both novels, as will be discussed, and some of Eliot's critical essays explicitly 
examine the position of women in Victorian society, but the scope of this thesis aims 
to examine Eliot's thinking in terms of human relations in the broadest sense. I will 
examine the development of Eliot's central characters in both novels, and the 
implications of their struggles of conscience for both the individual and society. 
Chapter 1 
The Mill on the Floss 
She rebelled against her lot ... and fits even of anger and hatred... 
would flow out over her affections and conscience... 
and frighten her with the sense that it was not difficult 
for her to become a demon. (Eliot The Mill on the Floss 380) 
In The Mill on the Floss, Maggie Tulliver yearns to attain 'all that was beautiful and 
glad: thirsty for all knowledge' (MF 320), yet from her childhood onwards, she has 
to struggle against her society's dictates of what it considers to be her duty. Whilst 
this is explicitly linked to gender in the novel, social duty, as affirmed by St. Ogg's, 
will be examined in terms of its relationship with human aspirations, as both Maggie 
and her brother Tom suffer devastating consequences. 
Maggie has a passionate desire and aptitude for learning, yet she is excluded 
from pursuing a full formal education in favour of the appropriate behavioural 
knowledge of feminine decorum (or social duty) she learns at a girl's boarding 
school. Her intelligence is explicitly defined by her extended family as having only 
negative connotations, linked as it is to the dictates of gendered social determinism 
in the novel. Her father's response that 'it's bad, it's bad.., a woman's no business 
wi' being so clever; it'll turn to trouble' (66) reflects the social perception that 
Maggie deviates from gendered expectations, is therefore inherently 'bad' and 
somehow fatally predestined, the significance of which will be discussed later. 
Maggie's educational suppression directly compares with her brother Tom's 
ineptitude for the classical education imposed on him because he is a boy, but for 
which Tom has neither aptitude nor desire, being a boy of practical rather than 
imaginative applications. Apart from its deficiencies in the hands of his tutor, this 
type of classical education is irrelevant for Tom's needs, but Mr. Tulliver exhibits 
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what Eliot recognises in her 1851 review of R. W. Mackay's The Progress of the 
intellect as 'irrational faith', born out of ignorance rather than 'guided by those 
broad principles of reason' whereby belief is recognised as 'inferred from the whole 
of knowledge' (Eliot "Progress" 24). Tulliver's idea of improving Tom's prospects 
is to provide him with a 'good eddication... as'll be a bread to him.., so as he might 
be up to the tricks o' these fellows as talk fine and write wi' a flourish [as] it 'ud be a 
help to me wi' these law suits.., a sort o' engineer, or a surveyor' (ME 56). Rather 
than applying a sense of rationality and knowledge to what might entail a practical 
education for Tom, however, Tulliver applies his 'traditional opinions' and 
'unassisted intellect' (63) to his belief that his equally ignorant but self-assured 
advisor Riley's 'immovability of face and... habit of taking... snuff... [is] truly 
oracular' (64). 
The tutor, Stelling, is equally ignorant of Tom's individual needs, or of what 
Eliot recognises as the: 
true principle in education, that the reason must be cultivated as well as 
the imagination and memory, and that it must be cultivated by applying it to 
the sciences which are of immediate practical value in life. (Eliot "Milton 
and Education" [1855], Notebook 260) 
- - 
	 As Brian Spittles recognises, Eliot believes education should be 'concerned with 
self-understanding as well as comprehension of the external world' (89), have 
practical value, and 'be appropriate to the interests and abilities of the pupil' (94). 
Instead, Stelling delivers a debased and tortuous education, in which it was: 
the practice of our venerable ancestors to apply that ingenious instrument 
the thumb-screw, and to tighten and tighten it in order to elicit non-existent 
facts... [i]n like manner, Mr Stelling had a fixed opinion that all boys with 
any capacity could learn what it was the only regular thing to teach: if they 
were slow, the thumb-screws must be tightened - the exercises must be 
insisted on with increased severity, and a page of Virgil awarded as a 
penalty. (ME 243) 
Tom's sensation of powerlessness in his inability to comprehend his studies reduces 
him to 'something of the girl's susceptibility', and his feelings are relegated to a 
socially inferior realm where the 'human sensibilities predominated' (210). This 
gendering of powerlessness, and the idea of human sensibilities as relegated to the 
feminine division, is central to the novel. Significantly, this also includes Philip 
Wakem in his feminised state of 'extreme sensitiveness' (235) at public perceptions 
of his physical "imperfection" (he has a visually obvious curved spine). Philip has a 
'melancholy' face and hair 'like a girl's', which Tom, in defensive response to his 
own sense of inferiority being compounded by Philip's intellectual abilities, thinks 
'truly pitiable' (234). Philip's 'peevish susceptibility' (239) often leads him to 
emotional outbursts that echo Maggie's own in their angry savagery (240). 
Maggie's empathy for Philip is born out of 'her own keen sensitiveness and 
experience under family criticism', and her pleasure that someone other than her 
father could speak 'of her eyes as if they had merit' (260) highlights Maggie's need 
to be valued, ensuring her lasting affection for Philip. Mutual affection in their 
relationship is, however, coerced into duty as Maggie learns it is not acceptable to 
kiss Philip upon meeting after all (263), and feminine decorum is revealed as the 
public observance of social duty and its exclusion of "inappropriate" sentiments. 
Whilst the limiting of her desires and capabilities denies Maggie an outlet for 
her passions - which bears its own consequences as discussed later - it is also 
indicative of the social negation of human affections per Se. These are seen as 
unnecessary in St.Oggs' version of a civilised society, which enforces a move away 
from such irrelevances, teaching the younger members which social habits are 
customarily acceptable so that: 
We learn to restrain ourselves as we get older. We keep apart when we have 
quarrelled, express ourselves in welt-bred phrases, and in this way preserve 
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a dignified alienation, showing much finnness on one side, and swallowing 
much grief on the other. We... conduct ourselves in every respect like 
members of a highly civilised society. (91) 
When they are still children, however, human sensibilities are very much a part of 
their nature, social coercion having not yet had time to perpetuate its full effect, as: 
Maggie and Tom were still very much like young animals, and so she could 
rub her cheek against his ; and kiss his ear... and there were tender fibres in 
the lad that had been used to answer... so that he behaved with a weakness 
quite inconsistent with his resolution to punish her as much as she deserved. 
(91) 
Such "childish" tenderness is gradually suppressed beneath the veneer of social 
custom as human sensibilities are deemed the preserve of children, girls, and other 
inferior members of the community, by the empowered members of society who 
mete out social judgement. The only passion St.Ogg's appears to accept is the 
obligation to perform one's duty in a drive towards a present and a future 
paradoxically entrenched in the past. The values of societal duty stresses obedience 
to the dictates of parental and patriarchal authority as the explicit duty of both 
Maggie and Tom is to know 'who they've to look to... [to] let 'em know their 
condition i' life, and what they're come down to, and make 'em feel as they've got 
to suffer for their father's faults' (292); a social duty, then, which carries an overt 
Old Testament message that the sins of the fathers be visited upon the children. 
This duty does indeed become a "curse" for both Maggie and Tom, as will be 
discussed later, despite some members of St.Ogg's society (albeit self-deprecating or 
ignored) continuing to perpetuate a haunting undercurrent of the vital significance of 
human sympathy. Tom and Maggie's Aunt Moss derides herself on her 
"uselessness" in being 'a poor aunt to you, for I'm one o' them as take all and give 
nothing', but she is the only one of the extended family who expresses sympathetic 
concern for the 'dear children' and her 'poor brother' (298) rather than apportioning 
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blame, punishment and the dictates of social duty. That her "taking" refers only to 
financial support not the human concern that she "gives" emphasises their 
environment as one that extols the value only of the former. The narrow mentality 
encapsulated by the majority of the community echoes Eliot's 1856 discussion of 
W.H. Riehl's "Philister" figure in The Natural History of German Life, who: 
• is indifferent to all social interests, all public life, as distinguished from 
selfish and private interests; he has no sympathy with political and social 
events except as they affect his own comfort and prosperity... He has no 
social or political creed, but is always of the opinion which is most 
convenient for the moment. He is always in the majority, and is the main 
element of unreason and stupidity in the judgement of a 'discerning 
public'... [For Eliot however, the "Philister" is also] . . .the personification of 
the spirit which judges everything from a lower point of view than the 
subject demands - which judges the affairs of the parish from the egotistic 
or purely personal point of view - which judges the affairs of the nation 
from the parochial point of view, and does not hesitate to measure the merits 
of the universe from the human point of view. (Eliot "Natural" 292-3) 
Spittles recognises that 'such men [as Mr. Tulliver] are dominated by traditional 
attitudes, manners and behaviour... [which act] against change' (33), and that whilst 
the 'power of patriarchy passes... [to Tom who] is no less rigid in its application' 
(10), he suggests that Tom 'behaves that way because it is the only course that 
occurs to him' (34). In this, Spittles is ignoring how the societal structure coerces 
Tom into a form of self-abnegation as much as it does Maggie. Pauline Nestor, 
whilst suggesting that Tom's 'self-righteous and unyielding' tyranny over his sister 
is 'born of a narrowness which leaves him unable to respond... to the moral 
complexity' (58) of Maggie's struggles, does recognise that Tom's very 'certainty 
comes at the cost of damage to the self' (64). K. M. Newton, however, recognises 
that Tom's development has been distorted by the suppression of his human 
sensibilities as '[f]eeling and memory are suppressed in favour of the duties of the 
present... at the cost of an empty inner life' (105). 
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In realising he is of no consequence in being 'likely to be held of small 
account in the world' (ME 317), Tom reacts to having 'his interest in life, driven 
back and crushed on every side' by channelling himself into the 'ambitious 
resistance to misfortune' (368), and thus embraces social duty, not least because this 
enables him to attain his own patriarchal authority, thereby escaping the position of 
powerlessness. Tom attempts to "save" himself from further disappointment by 
making social and familial duty his aim in life: 'I have conquered [my feelings, 
and] ... found my comfort in doing my duty' (original emphasis, 613). Maggie, 
however, experiences great difficulty in channelling herself into the female dictates 
of 'unalloyed devotedness', putting forth instead 'large claims for herself where she 
loved strongly' (284), emphasising that the part of her perceived duty with which she 
struggles the most is its insistence upon the repression of human emotions. She 
becomes locked into a perpetual internal struggle between her heartfelt desires and 
her desire not to be blamed for failing in her duty. Tom has a 'natural inclination to 
blame' (283) other people whereas Maggie 'hated blame: she had been blamed all 
her life, and nothing had come of it but evil tempers' (284) and intransigence, 
emphasising that the marginalisation of human sensibilities leads to the social 
condemnation of Maggie for her exhibition of these, and that she recognises - and 
represents - the damage that blame engenders. In feeling a man's duty involves 
military bearing and the punishing of transgression (239), Tom resolves to always 
"do just the same again"... [when] viewing his past actions, whereas Maggie is 
always wishing she had done something different' (107) and had thereby somehow 
escaped the position of blame. Tom comes to encompass single-minded autocratic 
determination: his opinion is right and 'he would punish everybody who deserved 
it... [whilst] he never did deserve it', and as 'he was very fond of his sister... [he] 
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meant always to take care of her... and punish her when she did wrong' (original 
emphasis, 9 1-2), Maggie then, remaining eternally a child in the eyes of the 
patriarch. In becoming judge, jury and executioner, Tom assumes the mantle of 
St.Oggs' social duty and its gendered determinism, learning to suppress his 
emotions, yet, significantly, '[i]n his secret heart, he yearned to have Maggie with 
him' (213). 
In her 1855 article "Margaret Fuller and Mary Wollstonecraft", Eliot discusses 
Fuller's 'calm plea for the removal of unjust laws and artificial restrictions, so that 
the possibilities of [a woman's] nature may have room for full development' (180). 
Eliot cites Wolistonecraft in condemning the notion that women 'are supposed to 
possess more sensibility, and even humanity, than men' (183), arguing that the 
'thorough education of women.., will make them rational beings in the highest sense 
of the word' as, crucially, a 'really cultured woman, like a really cultured man, will 
be ready to yield in trifles' (my emphasis, Eliot 183). Mrs. Tulliver and the other 
Dodson sisters epitomise the ill-educated 'childish passions and selfish vanity 
[which] will throw a false light over.., objects' (Wollstonecraft cited Eliot 182), 
perpetuating their customary 'practice' and 'particular ways of doing everything... 
not shrink[ing] from uttering the most disagreeable truths that correct family feeling 
dictated' (MF 96-7). In The Mill on the Floss, the argument for education 
incorporates schooling and society, women and men, and appeals to the faculties of 
reason and human sensibility rather than St.Oggs' unreasoning ideology that 
customarily ignores the former and marginalises the latter. Eliot recognises a need 
for 'the co-operation of the intellect with the impulses' ("Evangelical" [1855] 145) 
in order to escape the stifling of 'natural good sense and healthy feeling.., by 
dogmatic beliefs', which, 'instead of sharing and aiding our human sympathies... 
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[are] directly in collision with them' (169). This is emphasised in the novel's 
recognition of the damage inflicted on both Maggie and Tom as their hopes and 
aspirations are 'stifled for want of an outlet towards something beautiful, great, and 
noble' by 'the mental level of the generation before them, to which they have been 
nevertheless tied by the strongest fibres of their hearts' (MF 363). 
Tom and Maggie's extended family are social duty incarnate, and represent 
the whole community. The insistence on familial duty and gratitude "owed" to the 
dictates of patriarchal authority are stifling the aspirations of both young Tullivers 
but for Maggie, in his embracing of their values, Tom becomes representative of 
them all. Her deep need for his approval and love emphasises the emotional and 
psychological depth of her struggles with her social duty, and recognises the damage 
it inflicts upon human relationships, for, even as a child Maggie questioned 'the use 
of anything if Tom didn't love her' (89). Maggie suffers marginalisation on two 
levels in her inability to conform to social expectations: in terms of her gender itself 
as excluded from full participation in society, and her inability to embrace the 
dictates of prescribed "femininity" within this marginalised position. 
Mr. Tulliver's perception of Maggie's character and cleverness (and later her 
own understanding of her passions) reflects her position of social blame. The 
positing of her traits as evidence of her wayward "wickedness" ultimately signifies a 
sense of her as both "outside" of her community, and as fatally flawed. This is 
illustrated by her dark colouring engendering social condemnation for being 'like a 
gypsy', and that 'it's very bad luck... as the gell should be so brown' (125). Her 
'dark heavy locks' of hair frequently act as a focal point of 'her mother's accusation' 
(61), the import of which will become clear. The full significance of Maggie's 
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marginalisation lies in her demonisation. She is the tainted gypsy/witch/demon 
whose unruly hair adds the look of 'a Pythoness' (79), and her passionate anger is 
described as though 'small demons... had taken possession of Maggie's soul' (161). 
Her violent treatment of the broken doll, kept as a 'Fetish which she punished for all 
her misfortunes' (78) with beatings and the hammering-in of nails, epitomises the 
stereotypical "witch-like" perception of her, and also facilitates her slide into self-
abnegation as will be discussed later. For Nina Auerbach, Maggie is inherently 
destructive, 'a woman whose primordially feminine hunger for love is at one with 
her instinct to kill and to die' ("Power" 171), suggesting Maggie has a 'destructive 
aura [which] takes shape in the associations of demonism, witchery, and vampirism 
that surround her' (ibid 157). Newton suggests that Maggie 'clearly has a Romantic 
sensibility' but that 'this tempts her to give way to strong impulse and to demonic 
forces in her nature' (110), and Nestor suggests that Maggie's 'vulnerability of good 
and rational intention to more anarchic forces is expressed... through the images of 
"small demons" (my emphasis, 61). Maggie's demonisation is, however, a social 
imposition rather than an inherent demonic nature, and these "demonic/anarchic 
forces" are Maggie's human sensibilities. That she is described as a "witch" 
throughout the novel is indicative of Maggie's status as outside of "respectable" 
Christian society, yet it is this very society which decries (its perception of) her lack 
of "feminine graces" at the same time as criticising her feminised human 
sensibilities, and will be shown to reveal its explicitly unchristian behaviour at the 
end of the novel. 
The significance of Maggie's childhood fascination with a picture of a 
"ducked witch" from The History of the Devil by Daniel Defoe cannot be 
underestimated in terms of the struggles she faces. She explains: 
ii;i 
It's a dreadful picture... but I can't help looking at it. That old woman in 
the water's a witch - they've put her in, to find out whether she's a witch or 
no, and if she swims she's a witch, and if she's drowned... she's innocent, 
and not a witch, but only a poor silly old woman. But what good would it 
do her then... when she was drowned? Only, I suppose she'd go to heaven, 
and God would make it up to her. (ME 66-7) 
The initial perception of the old woman as 'a witch' shifts to the anguished 
questioning of whether she is 'or no', as, whether or not she survives the ducking, 
social condemnation (and ultimately destruction) is assured. If 'she's innocent' she 
drowns and if guilty will be condemned by her community. For Auerbach, Maggie 
exhibits 'a silent murderousness', the ducked witch representing how she 'invokes 
her demonic self out of her books' ("Power" 160-I). The narrative of the ducked 
"witch", however, epitomises Maggie's dilemma in the novel as she constantly faces 
the testing of her "guilt" or "innocence" against social duty, and in always "falling" 
short, thus reaps condemnation. The significance of her later drowning is clear in 
the context of this passage, and Maggie's anguish and finally unanswered questions 
regarding 'what good' her struggles will have done her - including the question of 
whether the possibility of God 'mak[ing] it up to her' (ME 67) is enough - is crucial. 
The social marginalisation of Maggie's human sensibilities is emphasised 
through her depiction as Medusa. Auerbach suggests that Eliot's linking of Adam 
Bede's Hetty Sorrel with a 'medusa-face' identifies Hetty with 'lower forms of life' 
(Woman 174), and fails to recognise here the Medusa aspect of Maggie Tulliver 
altogether, aligning Victorian depictions of Medusa with forcing 'us to look into the 
serpent-woman's face and to feel the mystery of a power, endlessly mutilated and 
restored, of a woman with a demon's gifts' (ibid 9). In her journal article however, 
Auerbach recognises the link between Maggie's hair and Medusa, but claims that 
Maggie's 'turbulent hair that is her bane as a child is an emblem of destructive 
powers she is only half aware of and unable to control' ("Power" 156). In The Mill 
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on the Floss, however, Maggie's Medusa hair is, as discussed earlier, a focal point of 
her demonisation, and acts to emphasise Maggie's powerlessness: 
All the disagreeable recollections of the morning were thick upon her, when 
Tom, whose displeasure towards her had been considerably refreshed by 
her... causing him to upset his cowslip wine... [took Lucy] off... as if there 
were no Maggie in existence. Seeing this Maggie lingered at a distance 
looking like a small Medusa with her snakes cropped. (MF 161) 
- a cropping which emphasises her impotence, as she would turn her tormentors to 
stone thus disempowering them, yet she is unable to do so as she is powerlessto 
redress her marginalisation. The Medusa figure is typically recognised as demonic 
in Romantic and Victorian literature and criticism, as illustrated by Bulfinch's 
Mythology, a popular text in print in the 1850's: 
Medusa was a terrible monster who had laid waste to the country. She was 
once a beautiful maiden whose hair was her chief glory, but as she dared to 
vie in beauty with Minerva [Athena], the goddess deprived her of her 
charms and changed her beautiful ringlets into hissing serpents... Perseus... 
guided by her image reflected in [his] bright shield... cut off her head and 
gave it to Minerva. (Bulfinch 152) 
Percy Bysshe Shelley, in his poem 'On the Medusa of Leonardo da Vinci' (1819), 
claims Medusa encompasses 'the tempestuous loveliness of terror' (line 33). Whilst 
this poem emphasises Medusa's beauty, and suggests a powerfully humanised 
- image, it predominantly aestheticises the tenor of death. Equally, in Walter Pater's 
The Renaissance (1873) the same Medusa epitomises 'the fascination of corruption' 
(68). As Isobel Armstrong recognises, Pater pathologises women, who are 
'associated with ... death, necrophilia, and with transgressive knowledge. They 
fascinate and repel' (389). 
Rather than reflecting a corrupt and corrupting aesthetic born out of a demonic 
and destructive nature, however, Maggie's incarnation as Medusa recognises the 
Medusa figure of classical mythology as victimised, demonised, powerless, and 
above all, innocent In her notebook of 1854-79 in which she recorded her research 
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for The Mill on the Floss, George Eliot noted a paragraph from Stahr's Torso which 
discusses the 4h 
 Century B.C.E. "Medusa Rondanini", probably the earliest known 
representation of Medusa that emphasises her beauty and humanity. The extract in 
Eliot's Notebook translates as: 
[Medusa's] story is a tragic account of the acute jealousy of the ancient gods 
directed against all splendour and beauty in mankind. The poets of antiquity 
tell how Medusa... dared to compare herself in beauty to Athena, and the 
goddess, thereby enraged, changed the girl into a horrible monster. 
According to... Ovid... Medusa's fate was yet more undeserved. The wild 
god Poseidon raped the incomparably beautiful princess in Athena's temple, 
and the goddess... covered her chaste countenance so as not to witness the 
crime. Athena's punishment, moreover, fell on the innocent victim, because 
she was powerless to punish the guilty god. (Stahr cited Eliot Notebook 
Entry4Op.l8& 153) 
Athena demonises the innocent Medusa by turning her into a Gorgon, and later 
assists Perseus in his mission to behead the "demon" she herself created, mounting 
Medusa's severed head on her shield. This illuminating entry in Eliot's notebook 
provides an interpretation of the Medusa myth as one of demonised innocent victim, 
punished by the jealousy of the powerful Authority for the splendour and beauty of 
humankind she exhibits. Significantly, in The Mill on the Floss Maggie is 
emphasised as: 
.a creature full of eager, passionate longings for all that was beautiful and 
glad: thirsty for all knowledge: with an ear straining after dreamy music that 
died away and would not come near to her: with a blind, unconscious 
yearning for something that would link together the wonderful impressions 
of this mysterious life and give her soul a sense of home in it. (MF 320) 
Maggie Tulliver encompasses the passions and human sensibilities of a yearning 
human being not a destructive demon, yet is blamed and punished for these very 
qualities through a social demonisation, which she internalises. 
Maggie attempts to escape from this position as one of social blame - and the 
inner anguish this causes her - by embarking upon ascetic self-abnegation in an 
See Appendix 
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effort to turn her own painfully emotional self to stone. Her intense grief at finding 
never love but only fault is expressed as the painful 'contrast between the outward 
and the inward' (320). Her psychological and emotional pain, caused by familial 
and social condemnation of her natural 'forces' (320) combine with her gendered 
exclusion from any positive action towards redressing the family's problems, either 
financially or in preventing the implementation of her father's "curse" against 
Wakem, which Mr. Tulliver elicits Tom's promise to uphold in writing in the family 
Bible. Tom has gendered recourse to action in decision, voice and active agency 
whilst Maggie is disempowered in terms of all three; Tom admonishes Maggie for 
attempting to express her concerns with '[ble quiet... I shall write it' (original 
emphasis, 357). For Auerbach, for whom Maggie is purely destructive, 'even a 
potentially celestial book like Thomas a' Kempis's can be a source of evil in 
Maggie's hands' ("Power 167). Maggie's ascetic self-denial that she undertakes via 
a' Kempis is, however, a tactical attempt to prevent a "fall" (like Tom earlier) back 
into emotional turmoil as her disempowered status enforces a 'slow, changed life', 
which in turn becomes 'a dreary routine', and 'it is then that despair threatens' (MF 
367). Emotional and physical self-abnegation is the only avenue of action open to 
Maggie, as she attempts to transcend the confines of her perpetual condemnation by 
transforming her passionate yearnings into an elevated sublime self-negation. 
Maggie is seeking the 'unlearned secret of our existence which shall give to 
endurance the nature of satisfaction' (367); the sublime meaning of all her struggles 
and suffering. 
Maggie's childhood punishing of the doll as an externalised object of her 
passionate anger until it is 'entirely defaced by a long career of vicarious suffering' 
(79) transforms into the first sign of self-effacement when she cut off her hair to 
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attain 'deliverance from.., teasing remarks about it... [wanting] people to think her a 
clever little girl and not to find fault with her' (121). This attempt to remove her hair 
as a specific aspect of her victimisation echoes her demonisation as Medusa at the 
same time as her powerlessness. For Auerbach, Maggie's treatment of "love-
dismembered" dolls' suggests 'a certain murderousness' as, from 'the beginning, 
Maggie's kisses tend to take life rather than bestow it', exhibiting the 'rapacity' 
("Power" 157) of a vampire in all of her relationships. Maggie's abuse of the fetish 
is a reflection of her pain, rage and powerlessness, however, beginning life as the 
representative of those who condemn her (like Aunt Glegg), but that rage turns in 
upon herself, and her passionate yearning, in order to crush it - as the root cause of 
all her anguish - becoming the abuse of herself in the desire to numb feeling. In a 
sense, Maggie attempts to become the wooden fetish, and her incarnation as an 
impotent Medusa echoes in her desire to turn her own emotions to stone. Maggie is 
the Fetish that her family beat with their sticks of duty, dehumanising her as 
demon/witch/gypsy in an echo of the dehumanising nature of her whole community, 
as she will eventually experience. 
Philip recognises Maggie's suffering to be born out of her attempt to escape 
the 'petty family obstacles to her freedom' (ME 429), but that her ascetic self-
abnegation has only negative connotations as: 
.shutting yourself up in a narrow self-delusive fanaticism.., is only a way 
of escaping pain by starving into dullness all the highest powers of your 
nature. Joy and peace are not resignation: resignation is the willing 
endurance of a pain that is not allayed... it is stupefaction to remain in 
ignorance - to shut up all the avenues by which the life of your fellow-men 
might become known to you. (427) 
As Suzanne Graver recognises, for Maggie, 'the asceticism of a' Kempis renders his 
message... remote from this living world' (190). Philip understands the value of 
Maggie's human sensibilities, and his philosophy, as Joseph Wiesenfarth recognises 
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(Eliot Notebook xxiv), echoes sentiments expressed in Wilhelm Meister's 
Apprenticeship which Eliot was reading in 1854 and copied a passage from into her 
notebook: 
• . .the spirit and the senses so easily grow dead to the impressions of the 
beautiful and perfect... every one should study, by all methods, to nourish in 
his mind the faculty of feeling these things. For no man can bear to be 
entirely deprived of such enjoyments... for this reason.., one ought, every 
day at least, to hear a little song, read a good poem, see a fine picture, and... 
speak a few reasonable words. (Goethe cited Eliot Notebook Entry 11, p8  & 144) 
Philip says to Maggie that '[tihere are certain things we feel to be beautiful and 
good, and we must hunger after them. How can we ever be satisfied without them 
until our feelings are deadened?' (original emphasis, ME 397-8). In her 1855 essay 
"The Morality of Wilhelm Meister", Eliot engages with the crucial recognition that 
'the line between the virtuous and vicious, so far from being a necessary safeguard to 
morality, is... an immoral fiction', as those who experience 'their own falls and their 
own struggles' (132) recognise. Maggie's 'conflict between the inward impulse and 
outward fact... is the lot of every imaginative and passionate nature' (ME 367), and 
Philip recognises that in her asceticism, Maggie is denying the impulse to life itself 
but that her suppressed emotions will re-emerge 'like a savage appetite' (429). As 
Nestor recognises, 'Eliot understands that the dynamics of repression virtually 
guarantee the counter-productive element of such determined and relentless efforts at 
self-regulation' (62). 
Once Maggie's self-abnegated feelings are re-awakened to the possibilities of 
life towards which her yearning and passionate nature strive, 'she felt the half-
remote presence of a world of love and beauty and delight' (ME 495), a world 
remote because morally unattainable as she struggles against her feelings for Stephen 
Guest. He is her cousin's lover and she feels a sense of betraying Philip, but her 
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greatest anguish concerns her anxiety that she will again precipitate emotional 
estrangement from Tom, as 'the need of being loved' by her brother is in perpetual 
struggle with his 'judgement. . .[against which] she rebelled and was humiliated in 
the same moment' (503-4). In allowing herself to float away in the boat with 
Stephen, she attains a blissful moment of respite from the anguish and torment of 
struggle between her desire for Stephen and her deep need for Tom's love and 
approval; a moment which anticipates the siblings' final moment of sublime 
reconciliation in the flood. 
For Newton, 'the continuity of self which memory makes possible is a 
solution to the problem of identity in a world devoid of immanent order or meaning' 
(100). It is 'Maggie's feeling for the continuity of her life that makes her fear she 
may commit an impulsive action in contradiction with the past self which she feels is 
still present in her and which will separate her from her past' (Newton 103). In this, 
Newton sees memory acting as 'a human means of transcending the amoral, 
unstructured world... [and acting] as a source of authority for feeling' (102), and in 
ignoring the past, Maggie and Tom 'become obsessed with the necessities of the 
present' (104). The world external to human determination is, however, secondary 
to the struggles Maggie and Tom seek to transcend, as they lose their 'continuity of 
self' (Newton 100) through societal coercion into the diverging present of struggle 
and asceticism, or rigid adherence to the demands of social duty. Whilst memory is 
Maggie's inward access to the realm of human sensibilities tied to her childhood 
affections, as will be discussed shortly, Newton fails to recognise that the drive to 
continuity with the past is not an object in itself (which Newton sees embodied in 
'the mill itself' (106)); the past is symbolic of the human sensibilities both Maggie 
and Tom were able to affirm in childhood. In attempting to find 'the unlearned 
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secret of our existence which shall give to endurance the nature of satisfaction' (MF 
367) through her ascetic self-abnegation (seeking to transcend her own suffering 
through what could be termed a long timeless "moment" of passivity), Maggie fails 
to find an answer to the meaning of her struggles. In the boat with Stephen, Maggie 
is borne 'along without any act of her own will.., memory was excluded', as was all 
thought 'to the past and the future' (589). In yielding to the passive moment, 
Maggie's 'personality' (592) is subsumed, along with her ties and affection, without 
which she would 'feel as if there were nothing firm beneath my feet' (605); the 
moment then, in which memory, past and future are excluded becomes the 
transcendent moment in which human struggle is left behind. For Maggie, memory 
and the moral struggle itself are inextricably aligned with living in the world, with 
human affirmation and with access to the moral conscience. 
In Bob's cottage, when enduring public condemnation for not returning to 
St.Ogg's a married woman after leaving Stephen, Maggie reaches a crisis of 
conscience, but again, this is centred on her now seemingly irreconcilable 
estrangement from Tom, and Maggie agonises over whether 'something [was] being 
taught her by this experience of great need' (649). In questioning whether she must 
endure a long life in which she must 'struggle and fall and repent again', Maggie 
faces 'self-despair' (649). In renouncing Stephen, Maggie rejects what she explicitly 
recognises as a Fall into Temptation: 
• . into the sins her nature had most recoiled from - breach of faith and cruel 
selfishness; she had rent the ties that had given meaning to duty, and had 
made herself an outlawed soul with no guide but the wayward choice of her 
own passion. (597) 
Crucially, this is not another attempt to follow ascetic self-abnegation but a refusal to 
relinquish what Maggie recognises as "sacred" human sensibilities. In choosing 'to 
be true to my calmer affections and live without the joy of love' (603), Maggie 
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means sexual love, as a relationship with Stephen would be, for Maggie, an 
'irrevocable wrong... [bringing] sorrow into the lives.., that were knit up with hers 
by trust and love' (597). She is bringing her sense of self-unity to bear on her 
decision, choosing not ascetic self-denial but the affirmation of human sensibilities. 
Maggie recognises her deeper duty to be towards the sensibilities tied to her 
childhood Eden, encompassed in her relationship with Tom, and reflected in her 
constant search for 'the clue of life ... which once in the far off years her young need 
had clutched so strongly' (597). The childhood relationship between Maggie and 
Tom is one that Maggie yearns to reclaim, epitomising her ultimate need to 
experience love, acceptance, and the affirmation of her own affections, and lies in 
Tom's 'secret heart [in which] he yearned to have Maggie with him' (213). 
"Falling" in The Mill on the Floss forms a dichotomy of two kinds of "fall", 
constantly struggling against one another. Maggie "falls" in societal terms, but Tom 
does not, yet Tom falls from Maggie into social duty until they are momentarily 
returned to the Edenic clasp of childhood innocence and mutual affection. 
Childhood encompasses a kind of authentic realm of Edenic human sensibility, 
before the Fall into social duty and its dehumanising values, is accessed through 
memory and represents, for Maggie, the moral duty which embodies her own sense 
of salvation. For Auerbach, the 'heavy irony against "the world's wife" does not 
mean the wife is wrong in seeing that Maggie's wild swerve towards renunciation 
and her solitary return after the fact are the most destructive choices she can make' 
("Power" 167). In the novel, however, Dr. Kenn recognises that St. Oggs' social 
expectations are at odds with any real sense of morality, and that whilst 'an ultimate 
marriage between Stephen and Maggie' may be 'the least evil' as far as society is 
concerned, it would be 'a desecration' to Maggie's 'conscience [which] must not be 
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tampered with: the principle on which she had acted was a safer guide than any 
balancing of [social] consequences' (ME 627). 
Tom also follows a quest for salvation - to "save" himself from the anguish of 
thwarted aspirations - which he pursues through self-abnegation by suppressing his 
human affections, subsumed beneath his embracing of social duty. His love for 
Maggie (and indeed Lucy) is sidelined by his adherence to duty and the patriarchal 
rote he must assume. Tom loses his ability to recognise the value of human 
sensibilities through social coercion to "evolve" into a socially "mature" member of 
the community. By pushing these aside and channelling himself into the long hours 
of employment necessary to try to reclaim the family's earlier fortunes, and follow 
the dictates of his father's 'curse' (356) against Wakem, Tom "falls" from his Edenic 
childhood expectations and associated human sensibilities into the patriarchal 
responsibility he must shoulder as he is 'awakened now with a violent shock' (267). 
He thenceforth suppresses his inward feelings, which only find expression on his 
'usual saddened evening face' (355); his daytime face then, literally the façade of 
social duty. Yet all along, in his drive to claim back the mill, Tom too is trying to 
reclaim an idyllic past - not as an object in itself - but as an unrecognised need for 
his human sensibilities to be affirmed. 
For Auerbach, Tom is finally 'possessed' by Maggie, 'the witch's watery 
cousin, the.., mermaid... [who] lures Tom out of... protection... into the dangerous 
tides' ("Power" 165) and his doom. When Tom realises that Maggie has rowed 
through the flood alone to find him, however, he experiences an Epiphanic 
revelation as he finally comprehends the enormity of what he has lost; the vital 
importance to himself of Maggie and the values she represents. For Tom: 
It was not till.., they were on the wide water - he face to face with Maggie - 
that the full meaning of what had happened rushed upon his mind. It came 
with so overpowering a force - such an entirely new revelation to his spirit, 
of the depths in life, that had lain beyond his vision which he had fancied so 
keen and clear, that he was unable to ask a question... [but] sat pale with a 
certain awe and humiliation. (ME 654) 
Nestor argues against this moment as 'epiphanic' as it 'is entirely undermined by the 
repeated stress on the silent, unacknowledged, and so untested nature of Tom's 
realisation', seeing this as contradicting Eliot's question: '[wihat  is anything worth 
until it is uttered?... Utterance there must be in word or deed to make life of any 
worth' (cited Nestor 72). Tom's awe and realisation of the significant 'depths in 
life' (ME 654) are, however, an internal deed of revelation, deeply resonant of 
Maggie's yearning to attain 'the clue of life' (597), and a revelation he articulates in 
his 'old childish - "Magsie" (655), the name he used to call her in love and 
childhood union. This moment encapsulates a momentary transcendence, like the 
moments of asceticism and passive elopement as discussed earlier, but is different in 
one crucial respect. It is an active moment of human affirmation rather than a 
passive moment which transcends the human altogether. Whilst Maggie attained no 
answers to her exhausting struggle for the 'highest and best... her soul' (597) could 
attain other than the terrible vision of life-long conflict between her inward 
- aspirations and the external world of social coercion, she attains the answer she 
seeks in the moment of reconciliation with Tom. This moment encompasses 
Maggie's 'unlearned secret' (367), her yearning for 'the clue of life' (597), and 
Tom's 'revelation.., of the depths in life' (654) and Maggie returned to Tom's 
'secret heart' (213) at last. 
That the 'fruit from all her years of striving after the highest and the best' is 
'her soul', which 'could never deliberately consent to a choice of the lower' (597), 
posits the fruit of her Temptation as the sublime potential of her 'soul' in the mortal 
world. This highlights the dichotomy of "falling" in the novel as, in falling from 
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social expectations, Maggie is reclaiming her Edenic self, seeking the 'clue of life' 
(597); her highest human potential. Auerbach claims that, in The Mill on the Floss: 
the episode of an actual sexual fall becomes vestigial - Maggie's trespass 
is an illusion, existing only in its effect on the community and on other lives 
- for in her melange of demonic and transforming power, Maggie seems a 
fallen woman by nature, in whom any activity is secondary to the intense 
ambiguous impact of what she is... George Eliot's autobiographical 
projection is both the witch Defoe imagines.., spreading desolation and 
punished for it, and her community's legendary protector, the Virgin of the 
flood, who sanctifies the spot she visits. (Woman 183) 
Philip Fisher recognises, however, that the analogy of Defoe's witch points to 
Maggie's position of social condemnation, but like Auerbach, he suggests that 
'Witch and saint are both outside humanity' (my emphasis, 68). Whilst Maggie is 
clearly innocent of sexual fall, it is far from illusory in terms of the social 
condemnation she reaps, nor is the impact of her human moral struggle anything 
other than devastatingly experienced by Maggie. She is positioned by society as 
demonic and fallen by nature, and, as I have already argued, her link with Defoe's 
witch is clearly related to her demonised human sensibilities and position as one of 
social blame. In discussing Maggie's incarnation as Medusa earlier, I argued that 
her demonisation recognises that she encapsulates the splendour and beauty of 
humankind rather than a demonic nature. Maggie's beauty clearly lies in her human 
sensibilities: her love, affection, and compassion for others, her desire to seek out 
beauty and meaning in life, and crucially, that these should not be achieved through 
the misery of others. Even if all her desires came to nothing, for Maggie it could be 
'too late for everything, perhaps, but to rush away from the last act of baseness - the 
tasting of joys that were wrung from crushed hearts' (MF 598). 
That Maggie reaps social condemnation with no hint of "eternal reward" 
emphasises that she is adrift in a secular world, which offers the potential for 
salvation only in human terms, but significantly, it is a world that does not recognise 
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her values. Social duty in The Mill on the Floss imposes a sense of inescapable 
pessimism as the sins of the father are visited upon Maggie and Tom through the 
extended family's desire that the younger generation should suffer, be humbled 
before and obedient to the dictates of the previous generation. In burdening the 
younger generation with their sense of duty, St.Ogg's society inflicts upon them 
what is indeed a 'curse' (356), stifling the prospect of progressive human growth 
rather than trying to incorporate rationality and human sensibilities into the present 
and the future. In her essay on The Progress of the Intellect, Eliot discusses the 
struggle to free society from ignorant tradition in the pursuit of a social 'system 
corresponding to the wants and culture of the age, [which] would.., strike a firm root 
in man's [sic] moral nature, and.., entwine itself with the growth of those new forms 
of social life to which we are tending' (32). She quotes Mackay, who echoes the 
situation Maggie faces in remarkably resonant terms: 
Nations unanimously subscribed to the pious formula, which satisfied their 
imaginations, and pleased their vanity.., into a belief that they were wise; 
but which, at the same time, supplanted nature by tradition, the sources of 
truth by artificial disguises, and at last paralysed the sentiment which gave 
birth to it... We have long experienced that knowledge is profitable; we are 
beginning to find out that it is moral, and shall at last discover it to be 
religious... [In testing] truth.., by its fruits, that is, its instrumentality in 
promoting the right and the useful... while no real knowledge is powerless 
or fruitless, the fruits differ in refinement and value, the highest being 
unquestionably those disinterested gratifications which minister to the 
highest wants of the highest faculties.., realizing the mysterious longing of 
the soul, and promoting the accomplishment of its destiny. (Mackay cited 
Eliot "Progress" 36) 
Social "salvation" through marriage to Stephen would have meant, for 
Maggie, the loss of her 'highest... soul' (ME 597), which she sees as her "true" 
salvation - the only choice her conscience can make - and which the novel validates 
in the sublime moment of human affirmation. At the same time, Maggie's struggle 
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for her highest 'soul' is also a struggle with 'self-despair' as the perpetual 'struggle 
and fall and repent[ance]' (649) will, it seems, only end at death. For Newton, '[t]he 
highest form of tragedy... is produced by being true to human values or ideals even 
in the face of a resistant world that must inevitably triumph, causing human 
destruction or defeat' (106-7). Fisher suggests the social 'exile [Maggie] must go 
into.., is the exact equal to the death the book concludes with' (85), but that this 
leads to a death which embodies the 'exhaustion' of 'life wasted in an impasse it 
cannot leap beyond' (98), and Nestor sees Maggie's death as 'fantastic euthanasia' 
(71). Although the emotional death that exile represents for Maggie does 
significantly echo her actual death, particularly as both recognise the tragic 
destruction of human affections, the moment of death in the novel is clearly not 
recognised as deliberate self-sacrifice to foreshorten life's 'impasse'. In risking her 
life to save Tom, Maggie's values are life-affirming as Maggie looks at Tom 'with 
eyes of intense life' (ME 654), but that it is the moment of death recognises the 
impossibility of return or of a future without further struggle. Tom and Maggie 
attain a form of momentary salvation in their reconciliation, 'clasping' (655) one 
another; a moment in which the tantalising possibility of a loving, affirming and 
fulfilling life is framed. The tragedy in the novel is that human values and lives are 
being crushed, not by an anonymous 'resistant world' (Newton 107) outside of 
human determination, but by other human beings amongst whom Maggie and Tom 
live and who dictate the inhuman values of their 'highly civilised' (ME 91) society. 
Maggie and Tom are destroyed through being 'stifled for want of an outlet towards 
something beautiful, great, and noble' by 'the mental level of the generation before 
them, to which they have been nevertheless tied by the strongest fibres of their 
hearts' (363). For Auerbach, Eliot applies 'a Paterian criterion of intensity.., the 
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well-lived life is the vividly felt life that feeds into art', and as such, the flood 
becomes a 'sudden endorsement of sheer intensity [that] seems to overwhelm the 
novel's carefully constructed moral antitheses' ("Power" 152-3). The moment of 
death, however, recognises that the narrow mentality of Maggie's community rejects 
her values, as the social demonisation of human sensibilities assures the destruction 
of the "demon", the drowning of the innocent. The guilty inhumanity of St. Ogg's 
floats to the surface and becomes 'Death rushing on them' in the form of '[h]uge 
fragments, clinging together in fatal fellowship, ma[king] one wide mass across the 
stream... [and] hurrying on in hideous triumph' (ME 655), clearly echoing the 
seemingly unstoppable mass of the community and their 'obstinate continuance' of 
'evil-speaking... [and] self-exaltation in condemning ... the individual men and 
women who come across... [their] path' (636-7). Maggie and Tom seek - and find - 
absolution and affirmation with one another, but find no possibility of a positive 
future within the confines of their intransigent society. 
There is posited no future hope in The Mill on the Floss, only stagnation and 
despair, leaving only the clasped moment of human bliss to be briefly savoured, as 
the 'highest and best' (597) to which the human can strive for but never fully attain 
as it will be crushed by the dictates of 'uneducated feeling [which] has only the 
alternative of unquestioning incredulity, or of sacrificing and abrogating itself 
(Mackay cited Eliot "Progress" 22). The implications recognise the quest for human 
redemption as a momentarily positive, but finally pessimistic ethic. Eliot's last 
novel, Daniel Deronda, is equally concerned with the abnegation of human 
sensibilities, and the idea of redemption as potentially achievable through human 
faith. The vision of tragic pessimism in The Mill on the Floss is transformed into an 
ethic of survival in Daniel Deronda, but one that is inextricably complicated by 
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struggle and recognises the impossibility of return, positing instead a linear struggle 
for the "soul". 
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Chapter 2 
Daniel Deronda 
Let thy chief terror be of thine own soul: 
There, 'mid the throng of hurrying desires 
That trample on the dead to seize their spoil, 
Lurks vengeance, footless, irresistible 
As exhalations laden with slow death, 
And o'er the fairest troop of captured joys 
Breathes pallid pestilence. (Eliot Daniel Deronda epigraph, 3) 
In Eliot's final novel, Daniel Deronda, Owendolen Harleth begins with a 
consciousness of profound self-absorption, believing that 'so exceptional a person as 
herself could hardly remain in ordinary circumstances or in a social position less 
than advantageous' (DD 23-4), but ends the novel hoping that 'I may live to be one 
of the best of women, who make others glad that they were born [although] I do not 
yet see how that can be' (original emphasis, 810). Owendolen initially strives to 
deny her status as an ordinary mortal, and her gradual transformation is tied to the 
emergence of her moral conscience. Her relationship with Daniel Deronda plays a 
significant part in her moral development, and Daniel, whose self-conscious search 
for an as yet unknown destiny in the 'complete ideal shape of that personal duty and 
citizenship which lay in his own thought like sculptured fragments' (512), undergoes 
his own transformation. 
Owendolen begins the novel refusing emotional attachment to others, seeking 
only pleasure for herself through her overtly narcissistic self-absorption. Her desire 
that others should also perceive her as 'so exceptional a person' (23) goes so far that 
she has 'visions of being followed by a cortege who would worship her as a 
goddess' (10). Only her pleasure in being adored is of any consequence to her, but 
this must not include being 'directly made love to' as this would require her to have 
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an emotional response, whether positive or of 'repulsion' (70), thus destabilising her 
theatrical pose as the lofty adored Idol. As Brian Swann recognises, Gwendolen 
turns 'herself into a statue [as] an evasion and an escape from the world of people to 
the world of a narcissistic cult' (439). When this "god-like" position is undermined 
by Rex declaring his love, Gwendolen presciently sobs that 'there is nothing worth 
living for' if 'I can't love people. I hate them' (DD 82). Gwendolen's inability to 
comprehend her spurned lover's pain is directly linked to her lack of 'the slightest 
visitation of painful love herself' (70), suggesting that only experience can awaken 
conscience and echoing that even her love for her mother has been subject to 
Owendolen's refusal - and dread - of emotional attachment. An 'unpleasant sense of 
compunction' (96) increasingly forces itself through, however, rupturing the fabric 
of illusion she wraps around her conscience; it is an eruption of Gwendolen's 
conscience, but inextricably intertwined with her fear of "becoming" a mortal. 
From the earliest scenes, mirrors form a framing device for Gwendolen in 
which she constructs and enacts her theatrical scenarios of self. Early in the novel, 
Owendolen happened: 
• to be seated sideways before the... mirror... she turned to look at 
herself... She had a naïve delight in her fortunate self, which any but the 
harshest saintliness will have some indulgence for in a girl who had every 
day seen a pleasant reflection of that self in her friend's flattery as well as in 
the looking-glass. And even in this beginning of troubles, while for lack of 
anything else to do she sat gazing at her image... her face gathered a 
complacency... Her beautiful lips curled into a more and more decided 
smile, till at last she took off her hat, leaned forward and kissed the cold 
glass which had looked so warm. How could she believe in sorrow? If it 
attacked her, she felt the force to crush it, to defy it, or run away from it, as 
she had done already. (18) 
The link with Narcissus is clear in the exclusive self-love and kissing of her own 
reflection and from the unattainable nature of what she desires, which, for 
Gwendolen, is to attain 'cold' statuesque perfection and a "divine" status, and thus 
the avoidance of 'warm' human emotions as these inevitably include 'sorrow'. In 
his History of Philosophy (1871), G. H. Lewes rejects the idea that the mind is a 
minor that reflects a truthful reality of the world into the consciousness of the 
individual: 
The radical error of those who believe that we perceive things as they are, 
consists in mistaking a metaphor for a fact, and believing that a mind is a 
mirror in which external objects are reflected... Consciousness is no mirror 
of the world; it gives no faithful reflection of things as they are per se; it 
only gives a faithful report of its own modification as excited by external 
things. (original emphasis, Lewes History cited Newton 6-7) 
K.M. Newton discusses this philosophical position in relation to Lewes and Eliot's 
views of contemporary scientific thinking (6-7), their position being one which 
posits knowledge as interpreted in relation to feelings and experience. This quote 
from Lewes also reflects the error of the position Gwendolen is attempting to claim 
in its reversal of the imagery in Daniel Deronda. Gwendolen projects her false 
consciousness and image of what she desires to be into the mirror, using the minor 
itself to bolster her misconceptions and project her desire as reality. The quote also 
reflects Gwendolen's progressive seif-realisation, including her tendency to use 
other people as a 'reflection of... [hen] self' (DD 18) image, also introduced in the 
above extract from Daniel Deronda, and both of which will be discussed in this 
chapter. 
Gwendolen's egotistic 'ideal was to be daring in speech and reckless in 
braving dangers, both moral and physical', but when, in practice, life 'fell far behind 
her ideal, this shortcoming seemed to be due to the pettiness of circumstances, the 
narrow theatre which life offers to a girl of twenty' (63). Whilst the class and gender 
driven Victorian society Owendolen experiences is here explicitly termed a 'theatre' 
- the structured backdrop to social expectations and possibilities - Owendolen creates 
her own theatricality upon the social stage in desiring a role for herself as 
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omnipotent Idol for others (and herself) to worship. As Newton recognises, acting is 
'probably the main symbol in the novel of the ego's desire for power and 
dominance', allowing 'the egotist by an act of will to create his [sic] own idea of 
himself and to attempt to impose it on the world' (177). Gwendolen's self-love and 
growing self-doubt is reflected through a slowly changing perception of mirrors and 
framing in the novel, and crucially, one which follows a progressively destabilised 
sense of certainty. When she is returning home from Leubronn with the knowledge 
of sudden family poverty, Gwendolen recalls the earlier 'self-delight with which she 
had kissed her image in the glass' but which had now 'faded before the sense of 
futility in being anything whatever' (DD 229). Her referral back to the mirrored 
self-image in that more complete stage of naïve self-idolatry shows on what basis her 
self-assurance has been seriously questioned: how can she be exceptional now if no 
longer sure of her framework of social standing? After all, this is not only 
Gwendolen's chosen stage, as her society only recognises a sense of 'being anything 
whatever' (229) through social status. Eliot recognises that this involves the socially 
'established formulae about women', of moulding her into 'a doll-Madonna in her 
shrine', as: 
...(let him be a god, provided he be not living), said the Roman magnates of 
Romulus; and so men say of women, let them be idols, useless absorbents of 
precious things, provided we are not obliged to admit them to be strictly 
fellow-beings, to be treated, one and all, with justice and sober reverence. 
(Eliot, "Margaret" [1855] 185) 
In this, then, Gwendolen is directed into the social trajectory set out before her but 
intends to place herself at the apex of that position, not recognising its dehumanising 
nature as negative. 
Once back home, Owendolen renews her 'contemplation of the image there' in 
the glass, reinforcing the image of the objectified self as 'beautiful [which] was after 
all the condition on which she most needed external testimony'; internal testimony is 
rather less easily assured of being in a condition of "beauty" despite feeling 'clever 
enough for anything', as she is attempting to still her oscillation between outward 
confidence in her theatrical world and inner dread of 'that unmanageable world 
which was independent of her wishes' (DD 251). She is showing a marked 
separation now between her projected outer image and the glimpsed reality of her 
inward sensations, as her contemplation is now dispassionate and objective rather 
than narcissistically intimate; her self-idolatry is beginning to show signs of strain. 
Gwendolen's first glimpse of the macabre picture of the dead face and fleeing 
figure in the hidden panel reveals that her theatricality is an attempt to hide her moral 
conscience. During one of Gwendolen's early performances, when she has seated 
herself: 
in an admirable pose... Mrs. Davilow smiled and said, 'A charming 
picture, my dear!' not indifferent to the display... Gwendolen rose and 
laughed with delight. All this seemed quite to the purpose on entering a new 
house which was so excellent a background... [The panel discloses] the 
picture of an upturned dead face, from which an obscure figure seemed to be 
fleeing with outstretched arms... Gwendolen shuddered silently, and 
Isabel... said - 'You will never stay in this room by yourself, Gwendolen' 
[Gwendolen] closed it hastily... 'let nobody open it again.' (27) 
The picture in the panel acts like a niirror, but reflecting what exists behind 
Gwendolen's idolised image: her moral conscience, and the fears bound to it. 
Gwendolen locks the panel and hides the key, determined that nobody shall have 
access to her conscience, not even herself. For Newton, the panel is hiding 'her own 
ravaged inner self', born out of 'her repressed guilt' and precipitating 'her self-
division and self-alienation' (175). Gwendolen is, however, already dividing and 
thus alienating herself, and her relationship with the panel and her other reflections 
are the frames through which her realisation of her 'fuller self' (DD 674) is effected. 
The images from the panel resonate throughout the novel, perpetuating the link with 
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Owendolen's conscience. They hint towards what she is now - fleeing from the 
realisation of her moral conscience which she hides behind an emotionally dead 
enactment of life - and later, when despair threatens to overwhelm her and she is 
fleeing from the realisation of her 'worse self' (676). It reflects the face of her terror 
and the self she is terrified of, tied of course, finally, to Grandcourt's literally dead 
face and all this represents in terms of Owendolen's shattered illusions, her death-in-
life marriage and the serious masquerade that goes with it, and out of which arise her 
terrible 'phantoms' of 'Temptation and Dread' from which 'her fuller self.., sobbed 
for deliverance' (674). Owendolen's tenor of the 'ghastly vision' of 'a woman's 
life' (152) she flees from when she meets Lydia Glasher becomes herself when 
married to Grandcourt. Lydia's surname itself hints at her status as reflection: 
"Glas-her", as Swann recognises, seeing Lydia as Gwendolen's 'minor-image... 
reflect[ing] what Gwendolen will become, a slave' (440). 
After her first vision of the panel, Gwendolen attempts to reassert her desired 
self-image in her usual framing device of a minor 'which reflected herself and the 
room completely', but there is now a disturbance to Gwendolen's certainty as she is 
reflected 'obliquely with her three-quarter face turned towards the mirror' (DD 28). 
When the panel re-emerges during one of Gwendolen's public performances, she is 
again confronted by the spectre of her moral conscience, and her honor significantly 
takes the form of herself looking like a 'statue into which a soul of Fear had entered' 
(61). This emphasises Gwendolen's theatrical self-idolised image as one from which 
her conscience has been excluded, leaving her effectively empty, devoid of human 
sentiment and underlining her self-worship as a false idol. It reflects Gwendolen's 
dread of experiencing what Eliot refers to as 'every aspect of human life', as this 
brings with it 'the most hideous passions... of love, or endurance, or helplessness' 
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("Morality" [1855] 131), and Owendolen negates her human sensibilities in an 
attempt to be in complete control of herself and her destiny. As her conscience 
erupts into her constructed void, Owendolen briefly realises herself as human as she 
experiences an unwilling recognition of her own liability to 'fits of spiritual dread' 
(DD 63). In The Progress of the Intellect, R. W. Mackay suggests that: 
As matter is the soul's necessary instrument, so ignorance, more or less 
mixed up with all its expressions and forms, may be said to be as it were the 
eyelid through which it gradually opens itself to the truth, admitting no more 
than it can for the time support, and, as through a veil, learning to support its 
lustre. (cited Eliot "Progress" [1851] 35-6) 
This echoes Owendolen's inability to escape her gradual self-realisation as the 
process 'of human development.., is perpetually unfolding itself to... widened 
experience' (Eliot, "Progress" 21). That the 'awe within her had not found its way 
into connection with the religion taught her or with any human relations' (DD 63) 
emphasises that her conscience is still in a naïve stage in which self.reflection has 
not yet begun to stir. Gwendolen's 'spiritual dread' (63) foreshadows her later 
spiritual crisis as, crucially, this early fear of the solitude of 'exile' into 'vastness' 
(64) becomes manifest when she experiences her worst torments alone with 
Grandcourt on a sea of 'vast silence' in which she nearly despairs of 'rescue' (674), 
and later feels herself abandoned by Daniel towards the end of the novel. 
From their first meeting, Gwendolen is disturbed by Daniel as his 'gaze 
seemed to have acted as an evil eye', triggering her 'inward defiance' at the 
'unpleasantly conscious' sensation 'that he was measuring her... as an inferior' (10). 
Daniel is drawn to Gwendolen from the first, speculating whether 'the good or the 
evil genius [is] dominant' in Gwendolen's eyes, and deeming the 'evil genius' to be 
the likely dominant force as the effect of her glance upon him is of 'unrest rather 
than.., undisturbed charm' (7). In this, Daniel suggests that only a lean towards 
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'evil' creates unrest, implying that 'good' does not involve a struggle to attain. He 
also suggests that a woman should effect only 'charm'. As Heather Armstrong 
recognises, Daniel's initial relationship with Gwendolen is one in which 'he 
predisposes an answer that is a reduction of Gwendolen's complexity' (146). In 
implicitly recognising her eyes as the mirrors of the "soul", Daniel's speculation 
leads into the novel's use of minors, reflections and framing to chart the 
development of Gwendolen's conscience. Whilst Daniel himself comes to play a 
vital role in Gwendolen's self-realisation, in their relationship 'some education was 
being prepared for Deronda' (DD 430), as will be discussed later. 
Meanwhile, faced with having to earn a living as a governess, Gwendolen is 
determined not to accept such a necessarily deflated status and its subjection to the 
power of others. She decides to take - for her - the next logical step from her 
theatrical self-worship to the literal stage and what she perceives as the idolised role 
of an actress, 'of course... [of] a high position' (252), but is mortified when Klesmer 
points out the years of hard work for the likely reward of achieving 'hardly... more 
than mediocrity' (259). Klesmer's truthfulness causes Gwendolen to question her 
self-certainty so severely that 'the very reflection of herself in the glass - seemed no 
better than the packed-up shows of a departing fair' (262). Her desire for maximum 
homage on the stage of Victorian society reasserts itself, however, and, structured as 
it is upon hierarchical values, she still aims for social advancement. Gwendolen can 
only achieve social advancement through marriage, deemed 'the only true and 
satisfactory sphere' (143) for a woman, but a necessity Gwendolen had hoped to 
avoid in her now thwarted desire to 'achieve substantiality for herself and know 
gratified ambition without bondage' (252). Gwendolen insists that if she marries, 
she will not be ruled by her husband but means to lead him, for 'such passions dwell 
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in feminine breasts also' (39). The gendered hierarchy of woman as subject to man's 
power can also entail an equally false status of elevated morality, as Eliot recognises 
in denying 'over-zealous' assertions that women have 'moral superiority to men', 
because this leads to 'a case in which slavery and ignorance nourished virtue, and so 
far we would have an argument for the continuance of bondage' ("Margaret" 185). 
In Gwendolen's desire to become the revered Idol, however, she desires to attain the 
power of authority rather than morality, as her 'ignorance and childish vanity' and 
lack of acquaintance 'with the importance of life and its purposes' has trained her to 
'selfish coquetry and love of petty power', not looking 'beyond the pleasure of 
making herself felt at the moment' (Fuller, cited Eliot "Margaret" 182). Gwendolen 
is both cynical and naive regarding marriage. Whilst recognising that it entails a 
patriarchal imbalance of power in her determination that if married, she would not 
'renounce her freedom, or... do as other women did' (DD 132), she exposes her 
limited comprehension of the ultimate political powerlessness of a woman in 
Victorian marriage regarding the exercise of choice here. As she will soon realise, in 
this particular gamble of hers, Grandcourt holds all the cards. 
Echoing the figures in the panel as she initially flees Grandcourt and the 
'ghastly vision' (152) which Lydia represents for her, Gwendolen: 
• . .had acted with a force of impulse... [which] had come - not only from the 
shock of another woman's calamity thrust close on her vision, but - from her 
dread of wrong-doing, which was vague.., and aloof from the daily details 
of her life, but not the less strong... her feeling would have made her place 
any deliberate injury of another in the region of guilt. (297) 
Although the change in her financial circumstances leads her into temptation, right 
up until the last moment she is determined to reject marriage to Grandcourt, 'wishing 
him to understand... I may not be ready to take you' (original emphasis, 301). 
Patricia Spacks suggests that Owendolen is: 
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• . .able to "confront" reality only by making mental pictures of how poverty 
might affect her appearance. Although such pictures cause her first 
movement of sympathy toward her mother, whose looks have been affected 
by hardship, they also underlie her acceptance of Grandcourt... despite her 
knowledge that such acceptance will wrong others. (49) 
Owendolen's reflection before her interview with Grandcourt does show that 'there 
seemed to be a shadow lifted from the face, leaving all the lines once more in their 
placid youthfulness' (DD 296). Whilst this could suggest that Owendolen's decision 
is based on her concern for the effects of hardship on her beauty, it actually reflects 
her outer image of theatrical self-assurance at a time when she is determined to 
refuse Grandcourt, and deny her own inward uncertainty and the temptation to 
accept him. Whilst it is clear that Gwendolen's desire to preserve her mother from 
financial difficulties is a secondary motive, in accepting Grandcourt in full 
knowledge of displacing Lydia and her children, Gwendolen chooses to save herself 
from the social and power-related inferiority of becoming a governess, 'drawn [by 
Grandcourt's words] towards.., the suffused sense that in this man's homage to her 
lay the rescue from helpless subjection to an oppressive lot.., release from the 
Momperts' (302-3). Owendolen's primary motive is to save herself from an 
oppressive and powerless situation, and the irony here is clear as her final decision 
precipitates her into the very circumstances she most wished to avoid. In accepting 
Grandcourt, Owendolen believes she is choosing elevation to a social pedestal upon 
which she will again be idolised, and from which she will wield power, and this 
desire over-rides her earlier fears of a fall of moral conscience. After her decision, 
however, Gwendolen spends a sleepless night as 'here had come a moment when 
something like a new consciousness was awaked', and her victory of escape into 'the 
imagined freedom she would create for herself in marriage' had 'the taint of 
sacrilege upon it, which she must snatch with terror' (311-2). That this 'new 
consciousness' is the beginning of her recognition of herself as human is clear in her 
sense of 'sacrilege' and 'terror' being the fear of what her decision will reap, as this 
links back to her earlier 'spiritual dread' (63) of the realisation of her own moral 
conscience, which is, for Eliot, unequivocally 'specifically human' ("Evangelical" 
[1855] 144). 
For J. S. Mill, the natural development of women is 'entirely distorted' and 
'forcibly repressed' through social conditioning he likens to 'hot-house' treatment, 
ensuring 'certain products of the general vital force sprout luxuriantly', while 'other 
shoots from the same root... [which] are left outside in the wintry air, with ice 
purposely heaped all round them, have a stunted growth' (Subjection [1869] 21). 
This echoes in Gwendolen's potential goodness waiting for the conditions of growth, 
and risking having 'the healthy life choked out of it by . . . [that] which rears or 
neighbours it, or by damage brought from foulness afar' (DD 68). Gwendolen has 
been reared basking in self-idolatry, a worship instigated by her mother and which 
has left her "unhealthily" self-obsessed, and the 'foulness' is exemplified by 
Grandcourt, who does indeed choke the "healthy" life out of Owendolen through his 
tyrannical sadism and the self 'evil' (681) her relationship with him forces her to 
confront. In both situations, Owendolen is unable to experience 'the conditions of a 
healthy and vigorous life' (Eliot "Progress" 21). Both Eliot and Mill approach 
human development in "organic" terms, an issue to be discussed further in Chapter 
3. 
The relationship between Owendolen and Grandcourt is one of explicit 
theatricality from the start as Owendolen 'played at reigning' (DD 316). This is the 
nearest she will get to the lead she wishes to take as Grandcourt's measured drawls 
are eventually exposed as a consciously deliberate enactment of his own, behind 
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which his true character waits to reveal itself to Gwendolen in the secure patriarchal 
power structure of Victorian marriage. That the stage is associated with prostitution 
for the Victorians has resounding echoes in Gwendolen's social position of having to 
sell herself on the marriage market. Gwendolen's gendered powerlessness is 
recognised in the novel, as her 'complete enjoyment' at receiving maximum homage 
on the social stage is seen as understandable given that 'it is not quite mythical that a 
slave has been proud to be bought first' (100). Mill recognises the powerless 
situation of Victorian women as 'the primitive state of slavery lasting on' 
(Subjection 5), despite progressive improvements in all other social relations. 
Owendolen's misreading of Grandcourt before their marriage, despite the revelation 
concerning Lydia, emphasises her naive stage of theatricality as self-obsessed 
obscurantism. Her lack of comprehension is finally unveiled through a fall into the 
knowledge of conscience, of her own subjection to Grandcourt's lack of moral 
conscience as much as the realisation of her own. As Heather Armstrong recognises, 
Owendolen's relationship with Grandcourt teaches her as much as her relationship 
with Daniel, as 'she does learn something beneficial from her courtship and 
marriage.., the obstinacy of otherness and the exteriority of others' (144), although 
Armstrong fails to also recognise the important of Gwendolen's realisations about 
he rself here. 
Gwendolen understands herself to have "fallen" in moral rather than social 
terms. She experiences remorse after the marriage, accepting the penance of guilt, 
the 'spikes' (DD 328) of punishment but still, as yet, consciously adjusts her self-
image in an attempt not to feel them. She attempts to accomplish this by passing the 
blame onto Lydia as the one who has fallen, thus absolving both herself and 
Grandcourt from blame, and echoing the hypocrisy of social "morality". The 
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attempt fails, however, as all self-delusion collapses when she receives Grandcourt's 
diamond necklace from Lydia along with her curse, and, echoing Mill's analogy of 
marriage relations involving a 'yoke tightly riveted on the necks' (Subjection 11) of 
women, Uwendolen begins to realise that 'the cord which united her with this lover 
and which she had hitherto held by the hand, was now.., flung over her neck' (DD 
354). 
The imagery of mirrors merges with that of necklaces as Gwendolen reaps the 
'terrible plus' (598) of her gamble with Grandcourt. On entering Grandcourt's house 
as his wife, 'Owendolen. -. saw herself repeated in glass panels' (358) amidst her 
luxurious surroundings, but this sense of self-gratification transforms into 
entrapment as she receives the diamonds with Lydia's letter that the 'willing wrong' 
Gwendolen has committed 'will be your curse' (359). Gwendolen: 
• .could not see the reflections of herself then: they were like so many 
women petrified white... She sat so still for a long while.., those written 
words kept repeating themselves in her. Truly here were poisoned gems, 
and the poison had entered into this poor young creature. After that long 
while... Grandcourt entered.., and Gwendolen screamed again and again 
with hysterical violence. (359) 
Gwendolen's illusions are finally shattered, as reflected by her multiple images at the 
moment of self-realisation. The reflections are of petrifaction: the mirrored image 
represents the former statuesque but empty shell of her theatrical self, that, in a 
sinister reversal, is now reflecting Gwendolen's genuine terror. At the same time, it 
recognises that Gwendolen is trapped in her marriage with Grandcourt, and in this, is 
frozen into that state of mortal fear, as will become clear. 
Grandcourt insists that Gwendolen wear the diamonds and she is powerless 
against his will, 'frightened', and imagining his 'white hand... capable... of clinging 
round her neck and threatening to throttle her' (427). Significantly, Grandcourt 
himself fastens them around her neck, and the lead Gwendolen wishes to take in 
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marriage becomes a noose. The diamonds become costume jewellery for the serious 
masquerade of her marriage, enacted both publicly and privately with Grandcourt, 
and represent her choking conscience and choked life, subject to literal, 
psychological and emotional imprisonment at the hands of her sadistic husband who 
has no conscience and absolute control over her. The last time she recognises her 
own reflection in the glass is 'not in admiration, but in a sad kind of companionship' 
(430). Spacks suggests that here Gwendolen 'realises she is trapped in a tragedy... 
[and is] beginning to recognize herself as a human being' (49). Whilst Gwendolen 
now recognises herself as trapped in tragic reality, the significance of her recognition 
of herself as human cannot be underestimated. This moment comes when 
Gwendolen is dwelling on the 'new consciousness' she has entered following her 
moral fall, centred on her self-dread and destabilised certainty as 'she trusted neither 
herself nor her future' (DD 430). At the same time, this new self-consciousness has 
been formed alongside a potential hope that she may realise a 'better' self, a hope 
she centres in her relationship with Daniel as 'an inward safeguard against possible 
events which she dreaded [herself capable of performing] as stored-up retribution' 
(430). This placing of Daniel as her potential saviour has obvious Biblical 
connotations, not least in her 'feelings' having turned Daniel 'into a priest' (430), but 
the sense that Gwendolen has projected her need onto Daniel - a reflection of her 
'better' self as realisable only through the role of a Christ-like redeemer - has 
significant relevance to Gwendolen's changing perception of mirrors and framing in 
the novel, as: 
With all the sense of inferiority that had been forced upon her, it was 
inevitable that she should imagine a larger place for herself in his thoughts 
than she actually possessed. They must be rather old and wise persons who 
are not apt to see their own anxiety or elation about themselves reflected in 
other minds. (547) 
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Daniel has become, for Owendolen, the mirror of her moral conscience. The 
turquoise necklace represents her struggling conscience as she depends more and 
more on Daniel in her need for a sense of direction now 'her confidence in herself 
and her destiny had turned into remorse and dread' (430). Joseph Wiesenfarth notes 
that the diamonds 'continuously appear as a motif of enslavement.., the turquoises 
as a motif of self-mastery, personal responsibility, and moral freedom' (cited Eliot 
Notebook xxxvi). The turquoise represents her potential salvation, of being 
redeemed from the sin she has committed and that she dreads committing, a path she 
recognises as attainable only through Daniel, whom she consequently deifies. Whilst 
Gwendolen has now recognised her status as fully human rather than divine for the 
first time, her development into a sense of self-reflective human maturity is one that 
requires a further transformation. 
Meanwhile, the theatrical self-image, now shattered, becomes a theatrical 
enactment of marriage, but is a 'Satanic masquerade' (DD 762) behind which 
Owendolen's newly recognised human sensibilities are stifled beneath 
claustrophobic images of strangulation, suffocation, poisoning, and drowning. 
Whilst Daniel has become the mirror of her 'better' self, urging Owendolen to turn 
her fear 'into a safeguard' and use her 'sensibility.., as if it were a faculty, like 
vision' (452), Grandcourt has become the mirror of 'the evil within' (681), what 
Saleel Nurbhai and K. M. Newton recognise as 'the struggle of the good and bad 
angels - Deronda and Grandcourt respectively - for her soul' (99). This struggle is 
compounded by Owendolen's awareness of her own entrapment behind the theatrical 
image she is forced to adopt in her marriage. As Spacks recognises, Owendolen's 
marriage 'demands external modes of self-representation; she plays a part under the 
"exacting eyes of a husband" (replacing her mirror) who values only appearances' 
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(49-50). Whilst Spacks also recognises that Grandcourt 'condemns her to vision as 
through "a piece of yellow and wavy glass that distorts form and makes colour an 
affliction", she sees this as a progression 'from contemplation of minors to vision 
through windows, however yellow and wavy, mark[ing] an advance in human 
possibility' (50), a view Swann echoes (445). Grandcourt's yellow glass, however, 
which 'Gwendolen had... before her, affecting the distant equally with the near' is 
distorting her vision, associated with 'making... life no better than a promenade 
through a pantheon of ugly idols' (DD 672) and marks a sinister development that 
has taken place in Owendolen's relationship with the glass. Owendolen is now 
framed by Grandcourt's distorted gaze, significantly 'not recognising herself in the 
glass panels... in the painted gilded prison' (590) any more because she has 
effectively become imprisoned behind the glass. As Swann recognises, the 'glass 
panels which had once reflected her multiform now become a glass prison', as by 
now 'she has realized her real situation' (442-3). Owendolen is still a divided self, a 
theatrical image and an imprisoned conscience, but she now recognises the theatrical 
image as a false idol and both recognises and experiences herself as human. The real 
Owendolen is the suffering human being, trapped inside the mirror in enforced 
'Silence' (DD 565) where she 'schooled [herself] daily to suppression of feeling' 
(605). In contrast with her earlier deliberate avoidance of human emotions, 
Gwendolen is now forced into abnegating her human sensibilities at a point where 
this is recognised as "soul-destroying", as her 'belief... [in good] that seemed so 
strong and living within her - she saw... suffocated and shrivelled up under her 
husband's breath' (593). She is reduced to the status of 'an imprisoned dumb 
creature' (590), the minor now only reflecting for Gwendolen an 'expanded' (670) 
view of her luxurious prison in which she has to play her part to perfection. 
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Grandcourt, however, can see her 'with his narrow, immovable gaze, as if she were 
part of the complete yacht', having 'an intense satisfaction in leading his wife 
captive after this fashion' (672). Owendolen recognises the impossibility of leaving 
Grandcourt as '[h]er husband would have power to compel her' (603) to return, 
echoing Mill's discussion of the iniquitous legal powerlessness of a married woman 
whose husband 'can compel her to return, by law, or by physical force', as she has 
no legal rights, 'however brutal a tyrant she may unfortunately be chained to' 
(Subjection 31). Owendolen is trapped in the scenery of Grandcourt's own theatrical 
enactment, a bitterly ironic reversal of the one she intended. The noose of diamonds 
symbolises her imprisonment as it does indeed enclose her in a circle of glass, 
behind which 'her fuller self... sob[s] for deliverance' (DD 674), not only from her 
imprisonment but also from the terrible temptation to wreak vengeance upon 
Grandcourt. 
As Gwendolen struggles to keep her belief in her 'better self' (430) - that she 
currently sees as embodied in Daniel - the associated claustrophobic images merge: 
outward and inward, false images and real fears, suffocation and drowning, dead 
faces and self-dread. Imprisoned with Grandcourt in a sea of 'vast silence', 
Gwendolen dreads her own worst capabilities and 'cling[s] for rescue' - from the 
'murdering fingers' of her own wishes and Grandcourt's power - to her only life-raft: 
her desperate belief in Daniel's 'sympathy' and 'direction' (674). At the moment of 
Grandcourt's drowning, in seeing her 'wish' for his death 'outside me' (696), she 
feels her deepest self-dread is finally realised in her momentary hesitation with the 
rope. Moments later, Gwendolen refuses to be 'wicked.., lost' as she 'leap[s] away 
from myself... from my crime' (696) to save him, echoing the figure in the panel as 
she flees from her 'worse self' by jumping towards 'the dead face' of Grandcourt, 
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'close to me as I fell' (696). Daniel believes that Gwendolen resisted 'her evil 
thoughts' with a 'counterbalancing struggle of her better will.., almost certain' that 
her hesitation 'had no outward effect' (my emphasis, 696). The ambiguity regarding 
whether Gwendolen's hesitation renders her guilty of murder recognises the almost 
complete state of human uncertainty Gwendolen has progressively realised: her last 
remaining certainty is her faith in Daniel. Owendolen is desperate for his guidance 
and continued proximity as a refuge from self-despair. As Swann recognises, 'she 
adopts Deronda as her reflection of true values and interpreter of reality' (444). For 
Swann, however, Gwendolen's development halts with her transference from 'her 
own reflection' (443) to Daniel, as this completes her transformation into a 'new 
religion of humanity [which] centres on Deronda, and her new life is firmly fixed in 
belief in him' (445). Owendolen's gamble to attain social advancement and the 
perpetuation of her self-idotisation, she has long since recognised as the worship of 
false gods. Following Grandcourt's death, she is no longer imprisoned in his gaze, 
but she still clings desperately to Daniel as the reflection of her moral conscience 
with 'supreme need', still caught up in a last 'scene.., which she filled with his 
relation to her' (my emphasis, DD 796). The struggle to realise the full development 
of her moral conscience is still obscured for Owendolen by a shift from one idol to 
another, from a divine sense of self to a deification of Daniel. 
Whilst Daniel is positioned as Saviour by Gwendolen, this is a role he 
occupies throughout the novel. Daniel is concerned with 'lost souls' (365), being 
drawn to others 'in proportion to the possibility of his defending them, rescuing 
them, telling upon their lives with some sort of redeeming influence' (324). From 
saving Han's degree qualification (at the expense of his own) and Mirah from 
drowning herself in despair, Daniel is deified by all. For Daniel, however, 'such 
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suppositions' that he 'hardly want[s] anything for himself' other than 'giving himself 
to the famished tigress to save her and her little ones from starving.., like Bouddha 
[sic]', he finds 'rather exasperating' (465-6). Daniel is human rather than divine, 
having a 'thoroughly terrestrial and manly' physiognomy, '[n]ot seraphic... but still 
of a kind to raise belief in a human dignity which can afford to acknowledge poor 
relations' (186). Daniel also faces struggle: his sexual attraction towards 
Gwendolen, his own unthinking anti-Semitism, and his intense self-consciousness 
regarding his unknown origin and quest for future. This last is further complicated 
by his paralysis, caused by his sympathy conflating all courses with equal and 
therefore nullifying import as 'a pitfall of sympathy' which, 'too diffusive', acts to 
'paralyze action and moral force' (Heather Armstrong 170). As discussed earlier, 
Daniel also begins his relationship with Gwendolen by positing the 'evil genius' as 
her likely dominant force, as he feels 'unrest' rather than 'charm' (DD 7) in 
contemplating her. 
In his moral conscience and wandering energy being undirected, Daniel is 
(like Gwendolen earlier) somehow removed from human existence as he seeks a 
cause which would 'make him.., an organic part of social life, instead of roaming in 
it like a yearning disembodied spirit' (365). For Nurbhai and Newton, Daniel is an 
unformed figure, the biblical golem/Adam, 'into whom [Mordecai] can breathe a 
soul' (99), echoing my argument earlier which posits Gwendolen as an empty vessel, 
awaiting the realisation of her moral conscience. Daniel's political stance recognises 
that his life must be grounded in human experience as "the ages [should] try the 
spirits, and see what they are worth" (DD 511), and he becomes the "age" in which 
Mordecai's visionary 'spirit' can be embodied. Daniel again acts as saviour in 
rescuing the dying "prophet" from his 'widening spiritual loneliness' (472) by 
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bringing his own 'wise estimate of consequences which is the only safeguard from 
fatal error, even to ennobling motive' (513), and echoing his own advice to 
Gwendolen to use her fear as 'a safeguard' (452). Yet, at the same time, Daniel 
finds the idea of 'the transmutation of self (466) an alluring image, and this is one 
that raises questions at the end of the novel. 
Daniel's sexual attraction towards Gwendolen, whom he 'should have loved... 
if -', is posited by the novel as 'what is but momentary on the permanent chosen 
treasury of the heart', yet their relationship is clearly more profound than sexual 
attraction, and is deeply experienced by them both in its 'unspeakably touching' 
(450) intensity, which contrasts with the distanced ideality of Daniel's relationship 
with the 'freshly-opened flower' (732) Mirth. Newton suggests that Daniel's 
attraction towards Gwendolen represents a plot-change 'perhaps only reluctantly 
abandoned... [to] allow[ ] Deronda to recover a sense of tribal identity too easily, 
without facing some of the most serious difficulties' (191-2) yet recognises that 'the 
relationship with Owendolen is also an important stage in the evolution of Deronda', 
but goes on to posit this as being 'towards his tribal identity' (197). The significance 
of his relationship with Gwendolen lies, however, in its precipitating Daniel's 
recognition of his own human fallibility, as, not only does he come to recognise his 
own egoism in his momentary 'falling into an exaggeration of his own importance, 
and a ridiculous readiness to accept Owendolen's [deified] view of himself (DD 
564), Daniel fears that in her, he will meet his own 'precipitancy in the manifestation 
of impulsive feeling' and thereby be left with 'a stronger sense of weakness' (621). 
Daniel recognises a reflection of his own potential failings in Gwendolen (as Newton 
does recognise, but only in terms of needing 'a larger aim in life' (197)). In his 
words of advice to her, Daniel is directing his own moral growth, as his 'half- 
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indignant remonstrance' reflected his 'inward argument with himself' (DD 451). 
For Daniel, Owendolen's experience of suffering has, like his own, acted as: 
• . .a painful letting in of light... [giving] conscious[ness] of more beyond the 
round of your own inclinations - you know more of the way in which your 
life presses on others, and their life on yours. I don't think you could have 
escaped the painful process in some form or other. (452) 
As Heather Armstrong recognises, through his relationship with Gwendolen, Daniel 
too comes to recognise 'himself as erring and learning' (155). 
When Gwendolen finally realises that Daniel is a separate human - rather than 
divine - being, with his own 'wide-stretching purposes' outside of her imagined 
scenes and 'in which she felt herself reduced to a mere speck' (DD 803), she 
undergoes her final conversion. She is precipitated out of her claustrophobic 
suffocation into an agoraphobic vision of insignificance as her last self-imposed 
frame of reference is destroyed. The shock of her displacement from a position of 
'supremacy in her own world' (804) - and her last remaining certainties - throws 
Gwendolen into despair, her arms stretched out before her, again echoing the panel, 
in a helpless gesture of flight from the position of human isolation. In recognising 
Daniel as finally - and equally - human, Owendolen's final frame of reference for 
her moral conscience is realised as her own self, as the 'burthen of that difficult 
rectitude towards him was a weight her frame tottered under' (my emphasis, 806). 
In battling with her new-found human isolation when Daniel leaves her, Gwendolen 
struggles with profound despair: 
Through the day and half the night she fell continually into fits of shrieking, 
but cried in the midst of them to her mother, 'Don't be afraid. I shall live. I 
mean to live.' After all, she slept; and when she waked in the morning light, 
she looked up fixedly at her mother and said tenderly, 'Ah, poor mamma! 
You have been sitting up with me. Don't be unhappy. I shall live. I shall 
be better.' (806-7) 
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In being equally concerned with her mother's fears for her, Gwendolen's despair is 
counter-balanced by her newly recognised deep human affections, and she emerges 
determined 'to live' and 'be better'. Eliot recognises that the deepest struggles of 
human experience necessarily lead to a 'vivid interest in affairs' which: 
must obviously have tended to quicken her intellect, and give it a practical 
application; and the very sorrows - the heart-pangs and regrets which are 
inseparable from a life of passion - deepened her nature by the questioning 
of self and destiny which they occasioned, and by the energy demanded to 
surmount them and live on. ("France" [1854] 41) 
In experiencing her struggles of conscience, Gwendolen has become fully human as 
she is now 'alive' to the 'sadness' (DD 800) in others, and significantly, Daniel has 
recognised her as such and that the tendency to 'good' involves a great deal of 
'unrest' whilst 'evil', as Grandcourt has shown, can effect its own 'charm' (7). In 
their relationship with one another, Daniel and Gwendolen have each increased their 
human sympathy, eliciting a 'conversion' into a 'new consciousness', both 
potentially enabled to be 'something better' (430). Both recognise self and other as 
fully human, and that this involves self-reliance and mutual relations. The 
objectification of self or other dehumanises both, leading to ennui and oppression 
and, as Heather Armstrong recognises, 'unhealthy dependence' on one side and 
superiority on the other, as 'the asymmetry' of Gwendolen and Daniel's earlier 
relationship 'poses special problems for them both' (158-9). Daniel's rejection of 
Owendolen is, therefore, finally necessary to their individual development. 
Gwendolen emerges from her struggle with self-despair into calmer self-
reflection. In her letter to Daniel, she remembers his words: 
- that I may live to be one of the best of women, who make others glad that 
they were born. I do not yet see how that can be, but you know better than L 
If it ever comes true, it will be because you helped me ... It is better - it shall 
be better with me because I have known you. (original emphasis, DD 810) 
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Whilst this echoes the vita! role Daniel has occupied in terms of her own 
development, and even suggests Gwendolen may inherit the mantle of redemptive 
human fellowship from him, it also posits an equal amount of human uncertainty as 
'I may', 'I do not yet see', 'If it ever comes true' (810). 
For Newton, Daniel Deronda is 'concerned.., with demonic forces which are 
a threat to the ego during an identity crisis or when the will loses control over 
energies within the self (169). Lisabeth During suggests that Owendolen 'remains 
at the primitive stage of dread, a feminine daemon in a salon, afraid of the power she 
has and lacking that colder power that goes with moral indifference' (67), and that 
'[o]utside of a defined religious universe.., the feeling of dread just floats. It does 
not help to bring the dread self to knowledge' (70). I have argued that Owendolen 
does indeed progress into self-realisation through her own sense of dread. Further to 
this, in Daniel Deronda the demonic self is again realised as human, but rather than 
encompassing the social demonisation of human sensibilities as Chapter 1 argued 
regarding The Mill on the Floss, here the demonic self is the self-aware human 
potential for perpetrating immoral acts, the 'fear' of which operates as 'a safeguard' 
(DD 452) in the moral conscience: 'Let thy chief terror be of thine own soul' 
(epigraph, 3). Eliot recognises 'morality' as 'specifically human... [and it] is 
dependent on the regulation of feeling by intellect' ("Evangelical" 144). That the 
demonic self is human, and relates to the awareness and regulation of such impulses 
by the moral conscience, is emphasised by the contrast between Gwendolen's self-
dread regarding her demonic potential and Grandcourt, coldly reptilian rather than 
demonic and devoid of any moral conscience or human sensibilities. Unlike 
Maggie's social condemnation in The Mill on the Floss, Grandcourt's drowning can 
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be seen as not just Gwendolen's pivotal crisis (and convenience) but symbolic of his 
status as inhuman and thereby morally irredeemable. Gwendolen's rejection of the 
theatrical image, the 'contempt of appearance' (DD 608), is a rejection of the 
inhumanity of false relations in favour of painful - and uncertain - living. 
In Daniel's marriage to the body and soul of his visionary future (Mirah and 
Mordecai respectively) and leaving for a semi-mythical utopian quest (leaving aside 
actual historical events), there is a sense in which Daniel is transcending human 
society altogether and embracing a higher form of existence. Alan Mintz suggests 
that '[flo remain in [a] society of necessity involves becoming a Owendolen; and to 
become a Daniel, society - at least English society - had to be left behind' (151). 
During suggests that, 'in the conflicting resolutions.., the possibility of being ethical, 
at one moment given the most deterministic if not sociobiological justification 
[through Daniel's Jewish heritage/quest], is at the next moment assigned to the 
uncanny' (82). At the same time as asking if the only alternative offered to the 
cultural exclusivity of Grandcourt's 'English solipsist as psycho' is Daniel's 
'voluntary embrace of cultural determinism' (83), During suggests that Daniel's 
transcendence sums the novel, as: 
[Daniel's] sympathy fails to sow the seeds of impartial sympathy that would 
develop [Gwendolen's] faculty of seeing and understanding a world outside 
herself. From start to finish she finds it impossible to imagine how other 
people radically different from herself can even exist... [in the novel's] 
failure of sympathy to perform... moral regeneration on Gwendolen. (78) 
- not recognising Gwendolen's realisation of self and other at all. Whilst the 
juxtaposed ending of the novel does trouble critics, who usually posit either a 
positive or negative reading of either Gwendolen's or Daniel's "end", my reading 
focuses on the very uncertainty "the end" effects. If the transcendent project 
represents the importance of a human vision as an avoidance of ennui, it embodies 
the search for 'those disinterested gratifications which minister to the highest 
wants.., realizing the mysterious longing of the soul, and promoting the 
accomplishment of its destiny' (Mackay cited Eliot "Progress" 36). In offering the 
hope of human potential at the same time as apparently transcending the finally 
uncertain Owendolen and her society, however, it also recognises the human 
uncertainty that thinking about the present and future entails. 
Whilst her deification of Daniel is finally revealed to Gwendolen as another 
false reflection, her reliance upon his guidance was a necessary step to enable her to 
survive those desperate months with Grandcourt, her projected worse self that 
Gwendolen finally realises is an equally false image. Eliot recognises a process of 
development that shows how 'each age and each race has had a faith and a 
symbolism suited to its need and... stage of development' ("Progress" 19). Through 
her relationship with Daniel, Gwendolen finally realises her moral conscience and 
recognises that her choices lie solely within herself, and that she has - and must - 
instigate her own human redemption and survival. Her development of conscience is 
analogous to a deeper symbolic trajectory of historical human development, 
however, as Owendolen progresses from a pagan worship of the empty idol into a 
quasi-Christian discovery of and dependence on God in the form of the Christ-like 
teachings of Daniel and the possibility of redemption (juxtaposed with the Old 
Testament God of Grandcourt, offering only purgatory and damnation). This is not 
to suggest that the novel is neatly parcelled into an allegorical myth, however, as 
Mintz recognises, seeing Moses as the predominant theme but also 'echoes of other 
heroes: the prophets of the Bible, Christ, the messiah of Jewish lore, and the figures 
of medieval romance' (163). Mintz argues, however, that the novel finally evinces 
'absence', avoiding 'rationality.., and a concentration of present complexity' by 
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positing 'potential or future certainty' (my emphasis, 165). The novel does indeed 
posit 'present complexity', and engages in a gradual removal of certainties which 
relate to iniquitous and immoral societal structures as much as a religious moral 
framework, as this chapter has made clear. Gwendolen's gradual realisation of her 
human vulnerability, and the potential despair of individual isolation coupled with 
the moral responsibility involved in relations with others, resonates with the 
progressively destabilised sense of certainty that this spiritual crisis has precipitated 
her culture into. Her final metamorphosis is into a spiritual abyss of uncertainty, left 
by the absence of the certainties of belief in God or social structure, and leaving her 
struggling with self-despair. 
Pauline Nestor suggests that the ethos of the novel 'offers an affirmation of 
sameness.., fantastically supplemented by the absorption of difference', and is 
'shadowed by the sad and diminished figure of Gwendolen' (154-5), a reading Philip 
Fisher echoes (209). For Nurbhai and Newton, the denouement posits 'a complete 
humanity... [as] the ultimate aim and necessary for the completion of the individual' 
(107), seeing this as 'the advent of a utopian era' (180) in which 'individual and 
universal [are]... inextricably linked, the form of one only being complete in the 
completion of the other' (188). Gwendolen here 'represents... the potential of 
Britain' (189) to regenerate itself through completion 'by gaining a soul' (190) and 
ridding itself of the dehumanising nature of 'empty tradition' (189) represented by 
Grandcourt. Daniel Deronda does recognise the vital importance of individual 
wholeness - the 'fuller self' (DD 674) both Gwendolen and Daniel attain - enabling 
them both to realise the equal human status, potential and responsibility of self and 
other, but individual self-realisation should not be conflated into an homogenous 
mass of 'universal' humanity. The analogy between individual and social/national 
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self-realisation does not lead them to collapse into one another. As Heather 
Armstrong argues, to: 
.establish identity by either opposition or similitude is to participate in a 
totality encompassing the same and the other. The truly other has an alterity 
that is not relative to the I, but is revealed to the I... not a relation that erases 
difference, but one which preserves the distance and remoteness of the other. 
(original emphasis, 24-5) 
- but, I emphasise, not at the expense of the self. The novel posits the vital 
importance of recognising and respecting both mutuality and difference, of 
'separateness with communication' (DD 725), as it is the mutual (fully human not 
objectifying) relations between individual people through which the realisation of 
the 'fuller self' (674) is effected. As implied in the analogy between Owendolen's 
and Daniel's development and final quest, this is echoed in the potential formation of 
society and in international relations. In her relationship with Daniel, Gwendolen 
eventually realises both self and other as human at the same time as 'their 
separateness from each other' (803), and, as already argued, this leads to the 
recognition of uncertainty rather than the now discredited impositions of certainty. 
Nurbhai and Newton do recognise that 'the completion of the individual also 
depend[s] on the relation to... other individuals' (188). D. R. Carroll recognises that 
the novel's 'idea of the balance of "separateness with communication" is transcribed 
into terms of personal relationships' (379), but also suggests a projected 'complete 
unity' of the novel, positing this to simply be the 'cure' for 'Deronda's disease of 
sympathy' (380), imposing a sense of closure on the novel it clearly rejects. Heather 
Armstrong recognises that, in some of her letters, Eliot engages with a 'sense of 
uncertainty, as opposed to certainty' (original emphasis, 38), and, crucially, that 
Eliot's novels 'never pretend[ ] that the way of true relation is easy... portray[ing] it 
as changeable, demanding, messy' (179). 
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In her determination to 'live' (DD 807), Owendolen attempts to forge a 
positive future of human fellowship, but it is a future complicated by uncertainty. 
The final ethos of Daniel Deronda is - contra the pessimistic certainties of The Mill 
on the Floss - fraught with questions. At the same time as recognising the 
importance of a vision of hope for the future, the juxtaposition of Gwendolen's 
uncertain and vulnerable situation at the end of the novel recognises the uncertainty 
and vulnerability that living in the present and thinking about the future entails. 
Chapter 3 
The Issue of Salvation 
• .while no real knowledge is powerless or fruitless, the fruits differ in 
refinement and value, the highest being unquestionably those disinterested 
gratifications which minister to the highest wants of the highest faculties, 
and which earn for philosophy the title of a divine love, realizing the 
mysterious longing of the soul, and promoting the accomplishment of its 
destiny. (R. W. Mackay cited Eliot Progress 36) 
This chapter will explore the relationship between Eliot's non-fiction essays and 
reviews, which tend to posit a sense of optimism, contemporary Victorian thinking 
including Eliot's own letters, and the complexity and ambiguity which arise from 
The Mill on the Floss and Daniel Deronda. In both novels, George Eliot explores 
the struggles of her central characters to realise something better, to realise the full 
potential of their "souls" in the secularised mortal world. This chapter will explore 
how Eliot's non-fiction engages with the issue of salvation, as raised in the previous 
two chapters. I will examine how other Victorian thinkers engage with the issue of 
social salvation in order to contextualise Eliot's thinking and contribution to the 
debate, bearing in mind that her non-fiction is already directly engaging with the 
thinking of her contemporaries, and is informed by her own philosophical reading. 
As outlined in my Introduction, Eliot's translations of L. Feuerbach and other 
European philosophy and Biblical criticism, alongside her vast reading of critical 
thinkers such as Auguste Comte, J. S. Mill and J. W. Goethe either contributed to, or 
reflected, Eliot's own philosophical, religious and social deliberations. Feuerbach 
advocates human relations as themselves encompassing the "divine", that the 
'relations... of man to man [sic]... all the moral relations are per se religious [and] 
Life as a whole is, in its essential, substantial relations, throughout of a divine 
nature' (Essence [1841] 271). Eliot wrote in 1854 that '[w]ith the ideas of 
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Feuerbach I everywhere agree' (Letters 132), and 20 years later, echoes Feuerbach, 
albeit with a more corporeal emphasis: 
• . .the fellowship between man and man which has been the principle of 
development, social and moral, is not dependent on conceptions of what is 
not man: and... the idea of god, so far as it has been a high spiritual 
influence, is the ideal of a goodness entirely human (i.e. an exaltation of the 
human). (Letters [1874] 453) 
Like Feuerbach, Eliot values the spiritual equally with the corporeal, and herself 
exalts the human in urging the desire for 'a higher strain of duty to... [an] ideal... 
[of] human love and moral action' wherein human relations have 'sacredness' (453-
4). Further, Eliot argues that 'morality' itself 'is specifically human' ("Evangelical" 
[1855] 144), and recognises the vital importance of desiring better human and social 
moral values here on earth. In this, her retention of the relevance and import of 
Christian moral values (as opposed to dogma) as a necessary element to social 
salvation is central. As raised in Chapter 2, Eliot recognises a process of organic 
human development, and Comte's Positive Philosophy (1830-42) is highly relevant 
here as it underlies key aspects of Eliot's and Mill's thinking. 
In his Introduction to Positive Philosophy (1830), Comte posits an 
understanding of the human (and the wider universe) in organic terms: of an 
inexorable process of historical development (1), both individual and societal 
development (4-6), and of the organic interdependent nature of all sciences (14-15). 
It is worth elaborating here that for Comte, human intellectual development has 
progressed through three philosophical stages in all its deliberations, apart from 
social science. This last is still subject to the earlier unreasoning theological and 
metaphysical stages of philosophy rather than the final positive stage of 
contemporary intellectual development (12) that is currently applied to all other 
sciences. The first theological stage involves searching for 'absolute knowledge' 
through positing 'supernatural agents, whose arbitrary intervention explains.., the 
universe' (2). This is necessarily followed by the intermediate metaphysical stage of 
personified abstractions whereby 'the supernatural agents are replaced by abstract 
forces', and 'each phenomenon ...[is] explained by assigning it to its corresponding 
entity' (2). The final desired positive stage is then reached, wherein the mind 
recognises 'the impossibility of obtaining absolute truth' and 'endeavours now only 
to discover, by... reasoning and observation' the 'invariable relations' (2) between 
phenomena by considering 'only the facts themselves' (8). It is immediately clear 
that Gwendolen's three-stage development emphasised in Chapter 2 aligns with 
Comte's theory of positive philosophy, which for Comte as for Eliot, is related to the 
development of the individual, and to society as a whole. This is not to suggest a 
simplification of the complexity of individual and social developmental relations, but 
to emphasise the interrelated nature of development itself. As G. H. Lewes 
recognises, for Comte: 
The phenomena relating to mankind are obviously more complex than those 
relating to the individual.., and depend upon them... and we see also 
something peculiar, not physiological, which modifies the effects of these 
laws, and which results - from the action of individuals on each other, 
curiously complicated by the action of each generation on its successor. 
(original emphasis, Lewes History [1871] 653-4) 
Comte recognises the desirability and necessity of a comprehensive education 
for all (Positive 24), and advocates the need for an intellectually enlightened society, 
also views that Eliot clearly shares. The significance of social science being left 
behind in this progressive organic process is that, for Comte, the road to social 
salvation is to be found by applying positive philosophy to 'the study of social 
phenomena', thereby leading to 'a single body of homogeneous doctrine', at which 
point the 'final triumph of the positive philosophy will take place spontaneously, and 
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will reestablish [sic] order in society' (29-30). For Comte, society needs to escape 
from 'the existing evil', which 'consists above all in the absence of any true 
organization' (29) caused by the simultaneous application of all three philosophical 
stages in social thinking. Social order is the desired objective, and is 'the return of 
modern society to a truly normal state' (64-5). Once this has been widely recognised 
as both necessasy and inevitable, 'every sensible man should next endeavour to work 
for the triumph of that philosophy' (29). Social salvation then, is attained through a 
return to "normality", escaping the evils of confusion and revolutionary crisis (28) in 
the culmination of an inexorable organic progression through three stages that 
somehow lead society back to a state of peaceful normality. For Comte, then, 
thinking in unison is all. 
Whilst this echoes Chapter l's discussion of Maggie and Tom's search to 
reclaim the childhood Eden of human affirmation, the ultimate failure of which is 
due to a conflict born out of different forms of thinking, Eliot clearly recognises the 
unified social dogma of St. Ogg's as immoral, repressive and dehumanising, as is 
Maggie's potential alternative of ascetic self-abnegation. In The Mill on the Floss, 
Eliot affirms a positivist evolutionary organic growth of the individual members of 
successive generations, but not of inexorable social change, thus also posits the need 
for society's forms to evolve as well, rather than the repression of individual 
aspirations into a peaceful or "normal" state of social obfuscation. She does, 
however, clearly posit the moral need for unified thinking in terms of engendering a 
social education that is both broad and reasoning, but one that also affirms human 
sensibilities and individual aspirations. Gillian Beer recognises that Eliot is 
specifically troubled by Comte's assertion that "Humanity is composed essentially 
of the dead... If the living are admitted it is, except in rare instances, only 
provisionally", Eliot following this citation in her notebook with her concern that if 
'our duties are towards "Humanity" how are the living and those who are to come to 
be excluded?' (Comte and Eliot cited Beer 185). Whilst positing an 'undeniabl[e] 
truth' in the view that 'the only hope of extending man's sources of knowledge and 
happiness is to be found in positive science, and in the universal application of its 
principles', (Eliot "Progress" [1851] 18), Eliot recognises that the living (and future) 
members of society should be the focus of any philosophical thinking, and at the 
same time, recognises the ambiguity and complexities of attempting to fit 'living, 
generous humanity - mixed and erring, and self-deluding' ("Morality" [1855] 131) 
into a philosophical system. Gordon Haight notes that, in her 'adherence to 
Positivism... GE "never accepted the details of the system, never went beyond the 
central idea" (editorial note, Eliot Letters 318), and, whilst for Eliot '[m]y gratitude 
increases continually for the illumination Comte has contributed to my life' (Letters 
[1867] 325), her work increasingly argues against Comte' s sense of certainty. 
Harriet Martineau, who published her translation of Comte's Positive 
Philosophy in 1853, criticises Lewes for "introducing Psychology as a science in his 
- Comte papers" (original emphasis, cited Eliot Letters [1852] 108), a criticism Eliot 
clearly rejects as she follows this report by exerting that 'Comte himself holds 
Psychology to be a necessary link in the chain of science - Lewes only suggests a 
change in its relations' (108). Beer recognises that the question of whether there is 
'a morphology of the unconscious... as insistent and inescapable as that of physical 
organic life' (184) is a crucial one to Eliot and her contemporaries. For Lewes - and 
for Eliot - the importance of psychology as a whole, conscious and unconscious, is 
vital as it underpins human understanding of the complex organic development of 
both individual and society, of self-realisation and social relations, of theory as 
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'necessary to observation', and of the developmental workings of the mind itself as it 
'commences with the unknowable... learn[s] its impotence... [and] the limits of its 
range before it can content itself with the knowable' (Lewes History 648). The 
importance of psychology to Eliot is crucial to her thinking as examined here. 
Eliot's criticism of the immoral "morality" of Victorian social forms and 
opinions, and her advocacy of change, is clear from her reviews and essays. In her 
early review of J. A. Froude's The Nemesis of Faith in 1849, whilst Eliot criticises 
the 'questionable character' of some of the novel, at the same time, she praises: 
• . . its trenchant remarks on some of our English conventions, its striking 
sketches of the dubious aspect which many charactered respectabilities are 
beginning to wear under the light of this nineteenth century, its suggestive 
hints as to the necessity of recasting the currency of our religion and virtue, 
that it may carry fresh and bright the stamp of the age's highest and best idea 
- these have a practical bearing. (15) 
All of the issues she highlights here are those she continually engages with 
throughout her writing career, and the short but crucial last point of having 'a 
practical bearing' needs to be born in mind throughout. In the review of Froude, 
Eliot highlights the self-seeking hypocrisy evident in the ranks of the clergy, a 
criticism that focuses on the neglect of the spiritual nourishment of humankind. For 
Froude, 'the Clergy... who through all their waking hours ought to have for their one 
thought, the deepest and most absorbing interests of humanity' instead aim for their 
own social advantage and ambitious pursuit of, 'not cures of souls', but their own 
'livings: something which will keep their wretched bodies living in the comforts they 
have found indispensable' (original emphasis, cited Eliot "Nemesis" 16); the 
nourishment of the human "spirit" then, is seen as neglected but vital. Six years 
later, Eliot criticises the immoral "morality", motives and practices of Christian 
dogmatism in her blistering attack on the 'bigoted narrowness' ("Evangelical" 138) 
of Dr. Cumming, a 'preacher of immense popularity' (140). 
In this essay, Eliot criticises the preacher for operating an elitist system of 
heavenly salvation by exclusion, in his exposition of what Eliot terms 'the love of 
the clan, which is the correlative of antagonism to the rest of mankind' (original 
emphasis, 159). At the same time as espousing the service of God, Cumming 
denounces 'his fellow-men', who are not recognised as 'fellow-sinners and fellow-
sufferers' but are dehumanised as 'automata' of 'Satan', and therefore, as 'agents of 
hell' (160). The "othering" and dehumanising of fellow human beings Eliot 
recognises as pernicious to moral social values and damaging to both parties, 
engendering not love but 'hatred' (160), as discussed in both previous chapters. She 
denounces such 'perversion' as 'obstructive of true moral development', this last 
evident in the 'idea of God' which is only 'really moral in its influence' when 
'contemplated as sympathizing with the pure elements of human feeling.., which we 
recognize to be moral in humanity' (my emphasis, 168). For Eliot then, the idea of 
Christian morality she clearly values highly, and is keen to retain these values even 
whilst rejecting the existence of God outside of human contemplation. Eliot also 
retains the necessity of spiritual salvation, a salvation she perceives as effected 
through the experience of self-realisation and moral human fellowship. As morality 
itself is seen as an essence or element of human nature, it is, therefore, a vitally 
necessary (and natural) objective. J. S. Mill echoes Eliot's views on self-realisation 
as the experiential basis for effecting moral human relations, as morality 'consists of 
two parts', these being 'self-education; the training, by the human being himself 
[sic], of his affections and will', and the second is 'the regulation of his outward 
actions' ("Bentham" [1838] 71). Crucially, this last is 'halting and imperfect 
without the first' because it is our own self-reflection that provides the: 
• . .qualifications for regulating the nicer shades of human behaviour, or for 
laying down even the greater moralities as to those facts in human life which 
tend to influence the depths of the character quite independently of any 
influence on worldly circumstances - such... as the sexual relations, or those 
of family in general, or any other social and sympathetic connexions of an 
intimate kind. (71) 
From this seif-realisation comes altruism. Rosemary Ashton suggests that Spinoza 
and Feuerbach offer 'an ethic and a psychology applicable to men in their unheroic 
everyday' (159), and that, for Spinoza, 'self-interest is necessarily man's motive 
force, but by reflecting on it and... that if I am of supreme interest to myself, so also 
is my fellow man of supreme interest to himself, I can and must act altruistically' 
(158). Ashton fails to draw these points together to discuss Eliot's idea of altruism, 
the human divine, or the relationship between this and the ordinary individual, 
however, issues which this chapter is concerned to explore. 
In her essay on Cumming, Eliot's emphasis is again on the vital importance of 
the spiritual well being of humanity here on earth, positing Christian morality as 
valuable only when seen in the light of human relations (which are for her, the true 
object of morality and imbued with 'sacredness' (Letters [1874] 454)), and therefore 
only if working 'on the same principle that human sympathy is found a source of 
strength' ("Evangelical" 168). To pervert these values by the distancing of 
sympathy for one's fellow human beings is to posit a God 'who instead of sharing 
and aiding our human sympathies, is directly in collision with them' (169), and is 
therefore acting against what Eliot recognises as "genuine" human morality. Eliot 
does, however, optimistically posit a 'tendency towards good in human nature 
[which] has a force.., no creed can utterly counteract, and which ensures the 
ultimate triumph of that tendency over all dogmatic perversions' (170). In this, Eliot 
specifically posits an uncontainable element in human nature, which is clearly an 
element for "good" that she sees as engaged in an inexorable and organic 'growth' 
which will inevitably break through these dogmatic attempts to contain it as, 'build 
walls round the living tree as you will, the bricks and mortar have by and by to give 
way before the slow and sure operation of the sap' (167-8). As Suzanne Graver 
recognises, Eliot regards 'human nature not as constant but as continuously 
developing, moving slowly but comprehensively toward the improvement of 
mankind' (16). In her review of The Progress of the Intellect, Eliot also equates the 
'good' as 'synonymous' with the 'true', and that everyone who believes this, 'bears 
in his soul the essential element of religion' (32-3). Eliot is positing an optimistic 
belief in the inherent good in human nature (the "divine" element) that will 
inevitably overcome the repressive and negative operations of social and Clerical 
dogmatic forms; a certainty of human value. Eliot, then, appears to retain an 
element of metaphysical thinking in her positing the human as having the exalted 
religious aspect of a "divine", moral essence of goodness and truth. This is not a 
transcendent metaphysics, against which Eliot clearly argues in her advocacy of 
theory as necessarily having a 'practical bearing' ("Nemesis" 15), but a rejection of 
the Benthamite empiricism that excludes the equal value (or even existence) of those 
non-factual, unseen human sensibilities. As Mill recognises: 
In many of the most natural and strongest feelings of human nature 
[Bentham] had no sympathy; from many of its graver experiences he was 
altogether cut off; and the faculty by which one mind understands a mind 
different from itself... was denied him by his deficiency of Imagination... 
accordingly, Bentham's knowledge of human nature is bounded... [by] the 
empiricism of one who has had little experience.., neither internal.., nor 
external... [neither] prosperity.., adversity, passion nor satiety... [non] Self-
consciousness.., to which this age owes so much of its cheerful and its 
mournful wisdom... He had never been made alive to the unseen influences 
which were acting on himself, nor consequently on his fellow-creatures. 
("Bentham" 65-6) 
Clearly these are the consciously reasoned elements Eliot considers vital to self- 
realisation and her ethos of moral individual and social salvation, and the role of 
human imagination and sympathy are vital to both. Significantly, Mill criticises 
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Bentham's inability to recognise humankind 'as a being capable of pursuing spiritual 
perfection as an end... without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than 
his own inward consciousness' (68), strongly echoing Eliot's own position as 
discussed in the previous two chapters. Here, then, Mill is arguing against 
Bentham's position at the final logical end of Comte's third positivist stage, where 
'man... accustom[s] himself to consider only the facts themselves' and disregards all 
forms of 'abstract forces' which may be considered 'inherent in the different beings 
of the world' (Comte Positive 8). Mill is not advocating a retention of Comte's pre-
positive metaphysical stage, in which all objects 'do all that they do because it is 
their Essence to do so, or by reason of an inherent Virtue' (Mill "Comte" [1865] 
268) as he criticises the continuation of 'the empty mode of explanation by 
scholastic entities, such as [of] a plastic force, a vital principle' (289). Yet Mill 
advocates as 'an instructive and profitable object of contemplation' (332) the raising 
of social thinking to the region of a religion. Whilst this is only in so far as it 
becomes a 'power which may be acquired over the mind by the idea of the general 
interest of the human race, both as a source of emotion and as a motive for conduct', 
for Mill it 'appeals to that feeling of the Infinite, which is deeply rooted in human 
nature' (my emphasis, 333-4), and as such, Mill echoes Eliot's own retention of an 
anti-Benthamite metaphysical but organically human element in a refusal to forego 
the necessary importance of the unseen but existing human imagination, emotions 
and aspirations. Whilst it is clear that Mill's emphasis is on the corporeal human as 
he avoids Eliot's position of belief in a "divine" element, whether human or 
otherwise, Eliot and Mill both refuse to progress as far as Bentham's reasoning of all 
"non-factual" human qualities out of existence, considering these to be vital 
elements in both individual and social terms. 
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K. M. Newton suggests that, for Eliot, 'Christian morality and values.., must 
be preserved, but they must be based on non-metaphysical principles' (26). Whilst: 
The Enlightenment tended to think that morality could be justified in purely 
rational terms... for George Eliot, morality was rather a natural product of 
the social life of man; its basis was in human feelings which had become 
transformed into moral ideas through the interaction of men and society. 
(26) 
Whilst this is clearly evident in Eliot's thinking, not least that both morality and 
values must be grounded in human experience, she does also lay particular emphasis 
on the exalted 'sacredness' (Letters 454) of human relations, and the moral value of 
their experience. Ashton recognises that Eliot foregoes 'the inadmissible ground of 
Reason' as a means of "saving"... God and immortality', as both Strauss and Kant 
had done after seeming 'to prove them impossible' (152), yet does not explore the 
relationship between Eliot's "conversion to disbelief" (156) and her quasi-
metaphysical slant in positing the human as divine and in idealising human relations, 
other than to point out Eliot's 'much more enthusiastic remarks while translating 
Feuerbach' (152), whom Ashton cites. Later, Ashton does acknowledge that 
Feuerbach's 'emphasis on the use of the senses and the faculty of the imagination as 
central to religious myth and the exercise of moral duty alike', is a 'telling' influence 
'on [Eliot's] thought and art' (166), and that Goethe 'joins Comte and Feuerbach as 
examples... of thinkers who secularise religious feeling, channelling it into human 
feelings towards fellow humans' (170). Feuerbach's positing of there being 'no 
other essence which man can think, dream of, imagine, feel, believe in, wish for, 
love and adore as the absolute, than the essence of human nature itself' (Essence 
270) echoes Eliot's own position of human relations as bearing a 'sacredness' 
(Letters 454) in which: 
.the fellowship between man and man which has been the principle of 
development, social and moral, is not dependent on conceptions of what is 
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not man: and... the idea of god, so far as it has been a high spiritual 
influence, is the ideal of a goodness entirely human (i.e. an exaltation of the 
human). (my emphasis, Eliot Letters [1874] 453) 
For Eliot then, as for Mill, the organic human contains an "essential" spiritual 
element which must be catered for in both theory and practice, and crucially, 
provides the authentication for their advocating the vital importance of the individual 
who must not be sacrificed to society. 
In her review of The Progress of the Intellect, Eliot alludes to a 'more 
enlarged idea of providential evolution' which sees the morality of Christianity as a 
fortuitous progression in its suitability regarding the destination of human spiritual 
needs, as 'the peculiar religious and political history of the Hebrews' becomes 'a 
preparation for ushering into the world a religion which anticipates and fulfils the 
yearnings of man's spiritual nature' (31). Human spiritual salvation is not only 
desirable but an organically necessary evolutionary objective. Further to this, 
removing Christian religious sentiment from its narrow dogmatic forms and mythical 
origins would enable an organic 'development of the Christian system corresponding 
to the wants and culture of the age... strik[ing] a firm root in man's moral nature, 
and... entwin[ing] itself with the growth of those new forms of social life to which 
we are tending' (32), consequently leading to social salvation. Mill too recognises 
that 'the sayings of Christ are... irreconcilable with nothing which a comprehensive 
morality requires; that everything which is excellent in ethics may be brought withiii 
them', but explicitly recognises that 'other ethics.., must exist side by side with 
Christian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind', as 'the interests of 
truth require a diversity of opinions' (On Liberty [1859] 126-7). Mill clearly posits 
an ethic of moral 'regeneration' as the desired project through which the 'truth' of 
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perpetual human improvement (he avoids the religious term "salvation") will be 
attained, but one that recognises both multiplicity and individuality to be of critical 
value to society, and necessary to its arrival at a position of 'truth'. Whilst Eliot is, 
however, at a recognisable distance from Mill here as she does not advocate the 
necessity of multiple viewpoints in order to arrive at a sense of social 'truth', she 
clearly posits respect for difference and connection, as argued in Chapter 2. As Beer 
recognises, Eliot's exploration of 'British insularity' illustrates how it leads to a 
'meagreness of national culture', whilst 'the multiple past, both genetic and cultural' 
(187-8) leads to enrichment. Graver recognises that for Eliot and her like-minded 
contemporaries, '[t]olerance, which remains a value, is joined by brotherhood, 
[which is] now given predominance over the concrete ties of kinship' (57). For Eliot 
and Mill, the Comtean process of organic human development clearly focuses on the 
vital importance of moral development, which Eliot sees as effected through a 
natural progression into Christian moral values (minus the dogma), and both 
recognise as of value when divested of the theological but retaining a vital aspect of 
quasi-metaphysical form in pertaining to the moral, spiritual and social regeneration 
of humankind. 
In the positivist advocacy of the need for a broad social education, 'even 
among the mass of the people' (Comte Positive 25), Eliot's view that 'aesthetic 
teaching is the highest of all teaching because it deals with life in its highest 
complexity' and is a medium through which she works 'to make certain ideas 
thoroughly incarnate' (Letters [1866] 318), emphasises that her novels are indeed 
intended to educate her readership with her own philosophical views, including the 
necessary pursuit of human salvation in the corporeal world. Eliot is also very aware 
of the dangers of preaching, however, as 'no sooner do you begin to betray 
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symptoms of an intention to moralize.., than the interest of your hearer will slacken' 
("Morality" 130), as Ashton recognises (171). Rather than trying to moralise or 
provide pat answers through a binary characterisation of "good" and "bad" 
individuals attaining their "just" rewards, Eliot consistently engages her central 
characters in a personal moral struggle in which they wrestle with both their own 
impulses and external forces, and the positive and negative implications of their own 
decisions. Grandcourt's characterisation is the exception here, as he is the 
dehumanising face of those outmoded social forms, represented by St. Ogg's in The 
Mill on the Floss, which need to change to enable the salvation of all concerned. 
Eliot's central characters persistently exhibit her posited uncontainable force, which 
tries to attain the higher moral "good", and she - like Goethe whom she admires - 
depicts 'every aspect of human life where there is some twist of love, or endurance, 
or helplessness to call forth our best sympathies' ("Morality" 131), thus encouraging 
her audience to ask themselves deeply searching questions regarding their own moral 
choices, human relations, and the wider society. As Graver recognises, for Eliot, the 
role of writer is a vital part of the organic whole as '[l]iterature is not only an index 
but also an agent of social evolution' (186), and further, that Eliot 'attempted to 
capture... the forms of belief that characterized past and present communities, but 
also.., wanted to create through her fiction new forms of belief' (260). Comte 
recognises the 'interdependence between the progress of the sciences and that of the 
arts, owing to their innumerable reciprocal influences, and... that they have all been 
closely connected with the general development of human society' (Positive 48-9), 
and therefore, the vital role of art itself as forming both reflection and education in 
an organic view of society is clear. In Mill's critique of Bentham's narrow 
Utilitarian view of 'treating the moral view of actions and characters, which is 
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unquestionably the first and most important mode of looking at them, as if it were 
the sole one', Mill advocates the interrelated importance of the 'aesthetic aspect, 
or... beauiy', and the 'sympathetic aspect, or... its loveableness' (italics original, 
"Bentham" 84). For Mill, in these three interrelated aspects of actions and 
characters, the 'moral aspect, or that of its right and wrong... addresses itself to our 
reason and conscience; the second [aesthetic] to our imagination; the third to our 
human fellow-feeling', and as such, the 'morality of an action depends on its 
foreseeable consequences [we approve or disapprove]; its beauty [we admire or 
despise], and its loveableness [we love, pity, or dislike]' (84). This echoes the 
serious intent Eliot places on her writing as a source of social education, and is 
clearly related to the organic nature of individual and social development of the 
corporeal, emotional, intellectual and spiritual human that she and Mill adopt. Mill 
recognises the 'high moral value' Comte places on 'the creations of poets and artists 
in all departments' as their 'mixed appeal to the sentiments and the understanding' 
fits them to 'educate the feelings of abstract thinkers, and enlarge the intellectual 
horizons of people of the world' ("Comte" 324). 
In Eliot's desire to 'make certain ideas thoroughly incarnate' (Letters 318), the 
Utopian potential Daniel encompasses at the end of Daniel Deronda - and the 
momentary vision of salvation through human affirmation afforded to Maggie and 
Tom at the end of The Mill on the Floss - can be validated, and be seen to have 'a 
practical bearing' (Eliot "Nemesis" 15). For Graver, whilst Eliot strives 'to reconcile 
antitheses, to balance opposing forces, to discover integral truths concerning not only 
matters of gender but also of fact and value, sympathy and criticism, ideality and the 
hard, unaccommodating actual' (309), her fiction ultimately fails to uphold what 
Graver perceives as 'the organic concepts she elsewhere attempts regularly to 
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affirm... testify[ing] for the most part not to biological and sociological entities but 
rather to a myth or vision of organic unity' (308). Graver criticises both Eliot and 
her contemporary theorists, including Mill, for 'transferring their own needs to their 
idea of what community might be' (310), as this 'ideal of perfection [is] one that... 
embraced a secularised ideal of brotherhood - at the price.., of compromising 
empiricism in philosophy and realism in art' (310). Graver fails to recognise the 
vital role that the Utopian vision plays for Eliot, despite recognising that sympathy 
and imagination are essential factors for Eliot in enabling her society to 'extend the 
scope of sympathy to include... [those] "who most differ from them in customs and 
belief" (Eliot cited Graver 264), and that Eliot's use of these in her 'rhetorical 
strategies... effect extraordinary acts of balance: to satisfy her readers and challenge 
them, to arouse their intense sympathy yet allow for dissent, all the while averting 
their ultimate estrangement' (279). Graver recognises that Eliot's comments on 
sympathy and imagination: 
suggest three matters central to the aesthetic of sympathy: the affective 
function of literature; the importance of imagination in transforming belief 
into socially binding action; and the need to engage the reader in a 
community of feeling.., with the human community at large. [But] These 
principles speak, however, only to the purpose of the work of art - to enlarge 
the reader's sensibility to foster social Unity - and riot to the theans of 
achieving that purpose. (my emphasis, 265) 
Graver fails to recognise that an informed imagination is intended to effect that very 
means. For Eliot, if 'aesthetic teaching... lapses anywhere from the picture to the 
diagram', it 'ceases to be purely aesthetic', and as such, 'becomes the most offensive 
of all teaching' (Letters [1866] 318), opening itself to the danger of transcending the 
human reality she is clearly so concerned to engage with. Yet, crucially for Eliot: 
Avowed Utopias are not offensive, because they are understood to have a 
scientific and expository character: they do not pretend to work on the 
emotions, or couldn't do it if they did pretend... consider the sort of 
agonizing labour to an English-fed imagination to make art a sufficiently 
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real back-ground, for the desired picture, to get breathing, individual forms, 
and group them in the needful relations, so that the presentation will lay hold 
on the emotions as human experience - will... "flash" conviction on the 
world by means of aroused sympathy. (318) 
By positing a momentary vision of human affirmation in The Mill on the Floss and a 
vision of individual and social potential in Daniel Deronda, Eliot is providing 
hypotheses of mortal salvation, a necessary focus and human objective of hope to 
avoid the '[f]inality' of 'bewilderment or defeat' (Mackay cited Eliot "Progress" 
35), and thus averting the dangers of ennui, despair, or defeatism. For Comte, the 
abstract is essential to positive philosophy as 'the study of the generalities of abstract 
physics is [needed] to furnish the rational basis of a truly systematic concrete 
physics' (Positive 45). In positive philosophy, from the study and understanding of 
'science comes prevision; from prevision comes action' (38), for the 'concrete... 
sciences.., function consists in applying these [abstract] laws to the actual' (43). 
Eliot's vision is intended to be allied with and potentially realisable by 'breathing, 
individual' human beings through their being experienced by characters with whom 
her audience has attained 'sympathy' (Letters [1866] 318), and crucially, in both 
novels, tale place within an affirmation of human fellowship (Maggie with Tom, 
Gwendolen with her mother, and Daniel with MirahlMordecai). That these novels 
also both engage with human tragedy (in the deaths of Maggie and Tom, and 
Gwendolen's terrible torments and potential despair), the need for social morality to 
change is emphasised through Eliot's echoing of Mill's interrelated moral, aesthetic 
and sympathetic depiction of the actions and characters. Between the publication of 
The Mill on the Floss and Daniel Deronda, Eliot expresses the high value she places 
on the use of tragedy 'to urge the human sanctities' (Letters [1866] 319). She also 
clearly renounces the ideal of a metaphysical salvation that transcends human lives 
through those attempts 'to climb to heaven by the rainbow bridge of "the high priori 
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road", as she posits instead the value of being 'content humbly to use [her] muscles 
in treading the uphill a posteriori path which will lead.., to an eminence whence we 
may see very bright and blessed things on earth' (Eliot "Future" [1855] 137). Eliot 
is keen to place her Utopian vision of human salvation in the mortal world and 
propose a realisable present and future, but recognises in her fiction that the 
phenomena of living human individuals prevent an imposition of certain answers. 
For Comte, whilst 'precision and certainty are two qualities of very different nature', 
each science can offer certain results, provided: 
that its conclusions are not pushed beyond the degree of precision of 
which the corresponding phenomena admit, a condition that may not be 
always very easy to fulfil. In any science whatever, everything that is 
simply conjectural is only more or less probable, and it is not that which 
constitutes its essential domain; everything that is positive - that it to say, 
founded on well established facts - is certain. (Positive 61) 
Comte, as discussed earlier, is confident that the positive philosophy is both 
inevitable and desirable (29), and its application to social science engenders certainty 
in leading to 'the final triumph... [that] will reestablish [sic] order in society' (30). 
Echoing Comte's view that 'no idea can be properly understood apart from its 
history' (Positive 1) in her review of The Progress of the Intellect, Eliot advocates an 
appreciation of the forms and processes of the past as a vital tool to understanding 
	 - 
present society. In recognising how society is 'in bondage to terms and conceptions 
which, having their root in conditions of thought no longer existing, have ceased to 
possess any vitality' (19), social change can be effected, although this does not 
provide certain answers for the form of the future. As Beer recognises, by the end of 
her career, Eliot's earlier 'dependence of the future on the past is brought into 
question' (169). Gwendolen ends Daniel Deronda with her 'story... like that of the 
Zionist state,., still to come, a matrix of fictions not yet fixed and diminished by the 
retrospect of history', which Beer links to Comte and Darwin, amongst others, who 
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she sees as emphasising 'the unstayable and ever-extending movement of all 
phenomena' (180). As this thesis has argued, whilst the final stasis of The Mill on 
the Floss encloses Maggie and Tom in an immovable social state, the focus of the 
final novel is on the unknowable future. Eliot advocates a sense of certainty in the 
organic 'invariability of sequence which can alone give value to experience' 
("Progress" 21), yet at the same time, she recognises that this progressive individual 
and social human education necessarily includes the uncertain element of the 
individual human and the struggle between the individual and society, which thereby 
belies a predictable future. Comte's certain results, then, Eliot recognises as 
confounded by the 'corresponding phenomena' (Comte Positive 61) of the individual 
and unique human, and the complexity of their relations with others. 
For Eliot, the desire and necessity of 'spread[ing] enlightened ideas is 
perpetually counteracted by... idola theatri [entrenched habits of mind]' ("Progress" 
19). These are encompassed within a broad recognition of the ignorant attitudes 
towards education in all of its forms including its formal sense, the marginalisation 
of the "other" in the gendered suppression of women both inside and outside 
marriage, and the class and race-based obsession with social hierarchy and 
respectability. In particular, the social marginalisation of human sensibilities is 
recognised as intensely damaging, both individually and socially, Eliot positing the 
vital need for the affirmation of human affections and the recognition of individual 
aspirations, refusing to see people as a means to an end. Graver recognises that for 
Eliot: 
.the conscious decisions she... associates with living in complex and 
advanced (as opposed to simple and primitive [Gemeinschaft]) societies are 
essential to her delineation of characters who purposefully choose to 
repudiate the Gesellschaft [contemporary industrial society] of the 
marketplace and to devote their lives to a good they must themselves define. 
(115) 
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In these terms, Eliot attempts to merge the positive ideals of Gemeinschaft 
community feeling with the progressive ideals of Gesellschaft, rejecting the stasis of 
small-town mentality and the isolationist potential of contemporary society. In both 
earlier chapters, the issue of the demonic self is recognised as, respectively, the 
social marginalisation (through a demonisation) of human sensibilities in The Mill on 
the Floss, and in Daniel Deronda, the recognition of the potential evil the human self 
is capable of performing; this conscious recognition itself acting as a moral 
safeguard against the deliberate choice of an immoral act. In recognising that the 
demonic self is the human self, Eliot is refusing both theological and metaphysical 
representations of good and evil by grounding these forces in human emotions and 
actions, a process itself emphasised in the psychological development Gwendolen 
undergoes in the last novel where she projects her own impulses toward good and 
evil onto Daniel and Grandcourt. Eliot refuses the distinction of class, gender or 
race as a dividing-line between good and bad morals, as her central characters, 
struggling to attain the salvation of "higher" morality, attest. Maggie, Gwendolen 
and Daniel are all positioned as the marginalised "other" through their conflicts with 
the social dictates of gender, race, and social hierarchy, yet clearly all aspire to attain 
the highest morality. For Eliot, the 'line between the virtuous and the vicious, so far 
from being a necessary safeguard to morality, is itself an immoral fiction', as those 
who experience 'their own falls and their own struggles' ("Morality" 132) recognise, 
and as such, belie a totality of vision. The recognition and experiencing of the 
individual moral struggle itself leads to education in the broadest sense as the human 
self is realised as equal to fellow human beings, and human salvation is perceived in 
modest and attainable human terms. Eliot's retention of an aspect of the 
metaphysical "divine" in the spiritual human and her recognition of the uncertainty 
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of the future, do not affirm Comte's proposition that unified thinking is needed as a 
means of "normalising" social relations into 'a fixed social order' (Positive 29), as 
she is refusing the idea of social salvation as or through an homogeneous fixity. 
Eliot recognises the value of the ordinary individual, and her praise of 
Goethe's Wilhelm Meister echoes her own vision of attainable salvation: 
Everywhere he brings us into the presence of living, generous humanity - 
mixed and erring, and self-deluding, but saved from utter corruption by the 
salt of some noble impulse, some disinterested effort, some beam of good 
nature, even though grotesque or homely. ("Morality" 131) 
To return to Comte, for whom the positive philosophy is evolutionarily inevitable, 
'[w]hether... a good or a bad thing matters little' (Positive 29), Eliot posits the need 
for a salvation that is engendered from and for the 'good' of the individual and 
society, and is born out of the individual's own moral struggle. For Eliot, the road to 
salvation also reflects and respects difference between individuals rather than a 
totalising social order. Mill explicitly refutes what he sees as Comte's 'systemizing' 
of humankind into a single channel of pure altruistic motive, asking: 
Why is it necessary that all human life should point but to one object, and be 
cultivated into a system of means to a single end? May it not be the fact that 
mankind, who after all are made up of single human beings, obtain a greater 
sum of happiness when each pursues his own, under the rules and conditions 
required by the good of the rest, than when each makes the good of the rest 
his only object, and allows himself no personal pleasures not indispensable 
to the preservation of his own faculties? ("Comte" 337) 
Mill advocates the 'sufficient gratification' of personal enjoyments as 'favourable to 
the benevolent affections', denying both severe asceticism and 'the love of 
domination, or superiority', as one makes 'everything else painful' and the other 
'implies.., the equivalent depression of other people' (338-9). Mill clearly has an 
object of secularised individual and social regeneration in mind, and his emphasis is 
on an individual self-realisation which does not oppress others. It is important to 
recognise that, whilst Mill advocates a 'utilitarian doctrine' formed on the basis that 
RE 
'happiness is... the only thing desirable as an end', he regards both 'the end 
[objective] of morality' and that of 'rational conduct' as including 'not solely the 
pursuit of happiness, but the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness' (Utilitarianism 
[1863] 190). Mill recognising then, that the former aim of happiness as desirable but 
equally, that it may be 'chimerical', in which case 'there will be all the greater scope 
and... imperative need' for the mitigation of unhappiness, 'so long at least as 
mankind think fit to live' (my emphasis, 190). Here Mill strongly echoes the final 
position Gwendolen occupies in Daniel Deronda, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
emphasising the crucial importance of Gwendolen's decision to 'live' (DD 807) and 
follow her newly realised moral conscience in the pursuit of altruistic human 
fellowship, alongside her profound uncertainty regarding the future, in terms of 
happiness or anything else. Chapter 1 also discusses Eliot's recognition of the 
dangers of self-despair and that Maggie's final actions are life-affirming rather than 
deliberate self-sacrifice, positing the vital importance of choosing to live, and of 
seeking to balance one's own individual aspirations alongside those of others. For 
Beer, Daniel Deronda posits an image of freedom as, instead of drowning like 
Maggie, Gwendolen 'is taken to the edge of the plot, out of the marriage market... 
[and] the ordering of inheritance... [which] is as far as her freedom can go... [yet] 
for a George Eliot novel, it is a long way' (218). She suggests that '[n]o single 
future can be inferred from the present, yet we all live by prediction', but claims that 
Daniel Deronda is 'a novel about that which does not occur', because Gwendolen 
'does not kill Grandcourt nor... marry Deronda. Neither Deronda nor Mirah reach... 
reunion of affection with their mothers. Grandcourt does not conceive an heir by 
Gwendolen' (my emphasis, 219). Whilst the predetermined closure of The Mill on 
the Floss becomes the potential freedom of an indeterminate future in Daniel 
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Deronda, the latter is a novel that also explores the ramifications of freedom, 
recognising that freedom operates within the constraints of social coercion and social 
responsibility. It is clearly a novel about individual and social realisation, born out 
of moral struggle, which are indeed major occurrences, and affirms the necessity of 
human vision to enable the recognition that a future is possible. 
In 1879, W. H. Mallock, political philosopher and satirist, reviewed Eliot's 
work for the Edinburgh Review. He suggests that Eliot's 'entire philosophy is an 
impassioned protest against pessimism... present[ing] the human life and the human 
lot to us as worthy of all our piety... love and reverence', through 'beings who are 
not isolated, but linked together by countless ties of duty and affection; and.., the 
moral raison d'etre of existence' (457). Yet Mallock also recognises the tension 
between this position and an evident potential pessimism in the novels, seeing Eliot's 
ultimate ethos as life posited 'as nothing better than a "penal settlement", as, for 
Mallock, there is 'no happy and rejoicing brotherhood.., but a sad and labouring 
race of chained convicts, whose highest glory it is not to attempt escaping' (457). 
Graver recognises that, in Eliot's fiction, 'there is a continual tension.., between 
actual separateness or fragmentariness, on the one hand, and a vision of unity on the 
other' (124). For Eliot, there is a perpetual conflict between the individual and 
society, but her emphasis is on 'the struggle between elemental tendencies and 
established laws by which the outer life of man is gradually and painfully being 
brought into harmony with his inward needs', (my emphasis, "Antigone" [1856] 
245) rather than human inner life 'brought into harmony' with social form. Like 
Eliot, Mill is keen on the Comtean 'direct cultivation of altruism, and the 
subordination of egoism to it' (Mill "Comte" 339), and both he and Eliot recognise 
that this does not involve self-sacrifice but must be balanced by the realisation of 
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individual desires, objectives, and crucially, the individual search for a vision of 
spiritual salvation. Mill's ethos of self-determination does, however, posit more 
individual optimism than Eliot's fiction, as he prizes individual self-realisation 
through the qualified pursuit of happiness as the objective. For Eliot, however, the 
ties of affection to others are the predominant element, as every man and woman, 'in 
considering his or her past history, is... aware that it has been cruelly affected by the 
ignorant or selfish action of some fellow being in a more or less close relation of 
life', and as such, this self-conscious experience provides a strong 'motive.., to an 
energetic effort that the lives nearest us shall not suffer in like manner from us' 
(Letters [1874] 454). As Ashton recognises however, Eliot's view of renunciation is, 
like Goethe's, 'a noble but not unmixedly heroic action, rather one that is prepared 
for and carried out in the context of the mutual relationships of a larger social group' 
(172). 
Mallock recognises that Eliot 'does not underestimate the causes for despair' 
but asks if 'she over-estimate[s] the causes for hope?' (458). Beer recognises that 
for Lewes, the process of evolution 'makes the implicit explicit' (cited Beer 172) and 
as such, 'revealed the manifold potentialities of the world, not all of which could be 
realised' at the same time as bringing 'a sense of being responsible for the shaping of 
the future' (Beer 172). Eliot brings this ethos of uncertainty and responsibility to her 
affirmation of vision. In her positing of pessimistic certainty in The Mill on the 
Floss and a potentially positive uncertainty in Daniel Deronda, Eliot recognises the 
difference between theory and practice at the same time as the need for a reasoned 
theory to effect practice. Whilst Eliot does argue against pessimism, and her 
emphasis on the importance of human vision attempts to avoid the clearly recognised 
position of despair, her work does contemplate a much darker road. 
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In a letter written less than two weeks before her death in 1880, Eliot advises 
her friend Elma Stuart over the latter's concern regarding a close friend's conversion 
to Catholicism. Eliot herself 'would not venture to thrust my mind on [the friend's] 
as a sort of omniscient dictatress, when in fact I am very ignorant of the inward 
springs which determine her action' (Letters 551). Throughout her career, contra 
Comte's vision of a certain social order, Eliot engages with what she recognises as 
an inevitable ongoing conflict between the desires of the individual and the 
constraints of society in both her fiction and non-fictional writings: 
Wherever the strength of a man's intellect, or moral sense, or affection, 
brings him into opposition with the rules which society has sanctioned, there 
is renewed the conflict between Antigone and Creon [the individual and 
society]; such a man must not only dare to be right, he must also dare to be 
wrong - to shake faith, to wound friendship, perhaps, to hem in his own 
powers... 
our protest for the right should be seasoned with moderation and 
reverence... [as] lofty words.., are not becoming to mortals. (original 
emphasis, "Antigone" 246) 
In the letter to Stuart 34 years later, Eliot goes on to urge her friend to remember that 
'the reason why societies change slowly is, because individual men and women 
cannot have their natures changed by doctrine and can only be wrought on by little 
and little', and that she should refrain from dictation or remonstrance 'out of 
reverence for that sanctuary of inmost feeling which the closest union must leave 
free from intrusion' (Letters [1880] 552). To the last then, Eliot retains a firm belief 
in an organic and sacred sense of human nature, the sanctity of the individual and 
the need for a progressive evolutionary and organic society (at the same time as 
rejecting a totality of society), and of the need for human fellowship which respects 
others and affirms the individual road to spiritual salvation. At the same time, she 
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also recognises the conflict between the individual and society to be an ongoing one, 
and clearly recognises the potential for both hope and despair. 
In a letter to the positivist Frederic Harrison in 1866, six years after 
publication of The Mill on the Floss and ten years prior to Daniel Deronda, Eliot 
replies to his urging her to write a positivist epic by remarking that she has 'a 
consciousness tending more and more to consist in memories of error and 
imperfection rather than in a strengthening sense of achievement' (Letters 318). 
This sense of uncertainty is significant as it recognises the inability to encompass 
individual and social salvation into a system, whether through literature or otherwise, 
but does not - as her last letter to Elma Stuart attests in its urging respect for 
another's decisions - refuse the possibility of any certainties at all. Eliot posits 
certain elements needful in the drive for human salvation, in both her novels and 
non-fiction. The pessimistic certainty of The Mill on the Floss encompasses the 
resultant destruction to reason and human sensibilities - and individual lives - 
engendered by the failure of immoral social values to reform, at the same time as 
positing the necessity of positive human values to individual and social salvation, 
framed at the moment of destruction. This certainty of what constitutes both 
individual and social moral value, and the necessary elements to effect human 
redemption is clearly central to Daniel Deronda, but the final uncertainty 
Gwendolen faces recognises the presence of both optimism and pessimism as equal 
possibilities, placing human destiny explicitly in human hands. That individual 
salvation is an intensely private and sacred affair, and that each is responsible for 
one's own redemption, also recognises that the individual is equally at risk of 
isolation and self-despair. In her advocating a practical and attainable ideal of 
salvation, necessary for individual realisation and social form, Eliot posits an 
uncertainty of outcome but not of the elements needed. That a future is possible at 
all does, however, attempt to reject the final pessimism. Eliot recognises the 
necessity of spiritual aspiration and a vision of human hope for the present and the 
future, to avoid ennui, despair, or defeat. 
Conclusion 
The Everlasting No had said: 'Behold, thou art fatherless, 
outcast, and the Universe is mine (the Devil's);' to which my 
whole Me now made answer: 'I am not thine, but Free, and for 
ever hate thee!' (Carlyle Sartor Resartus 129) 
For Eliot, the object of religious feeling is humankind, placing salvation as clearly a 
corporeal rather than a transcendent ethic, and, therefore, working towards better 
human and social moral values is a profoundly desirable goal in the mortal world, 
both in the present and the future. Eliot posits salvation as spiritual, moral, and 
attainable, and as desirable in both individual and social terms; indeed, the one is 
organically necessary to the other. At the same time, the individual should not be 
sacrificed to the social whole, as realised in Eliot's positing a certainty of human 
value. She recognises the need for social change through the recognition and 
removal of those outmoded traditions which effect issues of race, gender, education, 
religious and social form, and prevent both individual and social growth. For Eliot, 
education in its widest sense is the means through which change is effected, and 
must include the elements of reason, sympathy and imagination to engage effectively 
in the human struggle in both theoretical and practical terms. She actively engages 
in the contemporary Victorian debate regarding social ethics, particularly in her non-
fiction essays, but clearly recognises her fiction as a deliberate and accessible arena 
in which she interrogates the human implications of contemporary Victorian 
philosophical, religious and social thinking. 
Whilst being morally desirable, human salvation is clearly an individual 
matter, and also a modest one, needing only to include relations of respectful 
equality with other human beings to be both moral and effective. This relationship is 
itself born out of the individual's own reflective experience of moral struggle, which, 
all 
alongside the elements of reason, sympathy and imagination, act to make such 
relations effective. Eliot recognises the oppression of the self through ascetic self-
abnegation, or of the "other" through dehumanising and oppressive social practices, 
to be damaging to the human sensibilities of both. This leads to stagnation, 
preventing the progressive growth of either the individual or society. For Eliot, 
contra Comte's certainty of social order or positing of a mythical "return" to 
normality, Eliot sees no end to history but an ongoing organic human growth on both 
individual and social levels. It is, however, necessary that social form is actively 
transformed to enable the organic growth of the individual. At the same time, she 
recognises that any progress is slow and often painful. Eliot's engagement with the 
oppositions and tensions within the ethics of individual and social development is 
not one in which she attempts to impose a certain answer, of either homogenous 
unity, or the victory of the individual over society, or vice versa. Whilst Eliot does 
propose certain elements that must be in place to effect individual and social 
salvation, both in the present and the future, she profoundly respects the 
individuality of the mixed and erring human, and appreciates the complexity of their 
relations with others and with social form, and the element of uncertainty that this 
necessarily entails. For Eliot, the dichotomy between good and evil is clearly 
grounded in the human, and she recognises that moral freedom operates within the 
constraints of social coercion and social responsibility. She does, however, attempt 
to refuse the position of despair by positing the necessity of moral human vision as 
an affirmation of both the present and the future. 
Whilst this thesis has been primarily concerned to explore the implications of 
the optimistic positivism of Eliot's work, the spectre of pessimism has been clearly 
visible, not least in the ambiguity and complexity Eliot refuses to ignore in both The 
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Mill on the Floss and Daniel Deronda. Eliot's desire to explore the ramifications of 
human existence in a secularised society, which faces the dismantling of both 
religious and social forms of certainty, is an engagement in a prolific and anxious 
debate, and the tension between optimism and pessimism is evident in her novels. 
During the period in which Eliot experiences her "conversion into disbelief" 
(Ashton 156), Alfred Tennyson is struggling from deep despair to restored hope in 
'That God, which ever lives and loves, I... / And one far-off divine event) To which 
the whole creation moves' (1833-50, Epilogue, lines 141-4) in his In Memoriam 
A.H.H. Six years after the publication of Daniel Deronda, George Gissing writes in 
his essay The Hope of Pessimism that the 'prospect of happiness on earth is a 
chimera', and anticipates a time when '[t]he grave will become a symbol of joy' 
(1882, 96-7). Eliot's relationship with pessimism, and with those other nineteenth 
century writers whose literatures also engage in the struggle between hope and 
despair in human destiny, is a provoking one. Whilst Eliot posits a vision of human 
hope for the future as necessary to avoid despair, it is one which often proves elusive 
as the relationship between optimism and pessimism is frequently a blurred one. For 
Eliot, 'to be a failure of Nature and to know it is not a comfortable lot. It is the last 
lesson one learns, to be contented with one's inferiority - but it must be learned' 
(Letters [1854] 134), a position that suggests the individual's only hope is to 
eventually be content with a pessimistic view of a present which appears to negate a 
more optimistic future. 
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Medusa Rondanini 
40' Century BCE. 
Copy of an original 440 (?) BCE, Height 0.39 m 
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